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 1453 
THE INTERNET AND THE HOBBS ACT: 
WHAT’S THE CONNECTION? 
Abstract: The Hobbs Act provides a federal alternative to traditional state rob-
bery charges by criminalizing any robbery that affects interstate commerce. 
Courts have interpreted the Hobbs Act’s commerce element broadly, by requiring 
the government to demonstrate that a robbery had a de minimis effect on inter-
state commerce. With this standard, robberies of businesses generally satisfy the 
statute’s commerce element, but robberies of individuals often do not. This dif-
ference between a state and a federal robbery charge is significant, because the 
Hobbs Act generally carries substantially harsher penal sentences. This Note ex-
amines when the use of the internet in the robbery of an individual should satisfy 
the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. With the internet’s prominent role in society, 
the answer to this issue could impact whether countless robberies can be charged 
as federal crimes. This Note, therefore, contends that courts should adopt a func-
tional test to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether internet use in a robbery 
satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. Adoption of this test would align 
with Commerce Clause case law and Hobbs Act case law. Furthermore, it would 
promote federalism and safeguard the traditional role of federal courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
Suppose that someone mugs you on the street, gets in a car, and then uses 
Google Maps on a phone to assist in their escape.1 Does the mugger’s use of 
the internet through Google Maps affect interstate commerce?2 
In this hypothetical, the matter of whether use of the internet affects inter-
state commerce is critical for determining whether this mugging could be 
charged as a federal crime under the Hobbs Act, rather than only as a state 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Oral Argument at 18:00, United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 16-
10213), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000012526 [https://perma.cc/
6CZG-9E4B] (recounting a hypothetical presented by a judge at oral argument). U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit Judge Jay Bybee asked a prosecutor during oral argument whether the use 
of Google Maps would constitute an effect on interstate commerce. Id. The prosecutor responded that 
it would affect commerce. Id. 
 2 See id. The hypothetical posed did not reflect the facts of the case. See Appellant’s Opening 
Brief at 4, Luong, 965 F.3d 973 (No. 16-10213), 2016 WL 4943650, at *4 (describing how the de-
fendant utilized the website Craigslist for assistance in committing an armed robbery). In the real case, 
the defendant advertised a car on a Craigslist webpage. Id. When a potential buyer met with the de-
fendant to purchase the car, the defendant robbed him at gunpoint. Id. The Ninth Circuit in 2020 up-
held the conviction and affirmed the holding that the defendant’s use of Craigslist to conduct a rob-
bery affected interstate commerce. Luong, 965 F.3d at 983–84. 
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crime.3 Although Congress originally enacted the Hobbs Act to address high-
way robberies in the 1940s, courts have interpreted the statute to apply to any 
robbery that affects interstate commerce.4 This interpretation renders the 
Hobbs Act applicable to robberies of businesses and corporations, but rarely to 
robberies of individuals.5 The Hobbs Act, consequently, would not traditional-
ly apply in the aforementioned mugging hypothetical.6 If, however, the use of 
the internet automatically fulfills the interstate commerce requirement, it 
would elevate many robberies of individuals to federal crimes.7 
Prosecuting a robbery as a federal crime, rather than as a state crime, can 
have significant sentencing consequences.8 When the government successfully 
prosecutes a Hobbs Act armed robbery, the defendant becomes subject to the 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (requiring a robbery or extortion to affect interstate commerce “in any 
way or degree”). To convict a defendant under the Hobbs Act, the government must prove both that a 
robbery or extortion occurred, and that such action affected interstate commerce. See United States v. 
Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining the two elements of a Hobbs Act prosecu-
tion). The government bears the burden of demonstrating that a robbery or extortion affected interstate 
commerce because Congress used its constitutional power under the Commerce Clause in enacting the 
Hobbs Act. Michael McGrail, Note, The Hobbs Act After Lopez, 41 B.C. L. REV. 949, 951 (2000); see 
U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, cl. 3 (affording Congress the power to regulate commerce between states). 
 4 See United States v. Culbert, 435 U.S. 371, 380 (1978) (ruling that any conduct that satisfies the 
Hobbs Act’s statutory language constitutes a Hobbs Act offense, regardless of whether the crime 
could also be charged as a state crime); see also United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 244 (5th Cir. 
1997) (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (discussing the legislative history and historical context of 
the Hobbs Act, and also noting that Congress enacted it to address labor unions that would rob and 
extort truck drivers on interstate highways). 
 5 See United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding that the extortion of an 
individual does not generally have an effect on interstate commerce, even in the aggregate); United 
States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 100–01 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating the concern that any robbery or extortion 
could become a federal robbery if businesses and individuals are treated identically under the Hobbs 
Act). Robberies of individuals can still fall under the jurisdiction of the Hobbs Act, but only when the 
government demonstrates that the particular robbery affected interstate commerce. See Perrotta, 313 
F.3d at 37–38 (examining how robberies of individuals can fall under the Hobbs Act when the victim 
“directly participated in interstate commerce,” such as when a defendant targets a victim due to the 
victim’s role as an employee at a business that engages in interstate commerce). 
 6 See United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 2000) (ruling that stealing from an indi-
vidual does not per se affect interstate commerce, even if the individual was walking to or from a store 
or a restaurant). In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 2000 decision United States v. 
Wang, the defendants followed the owners of a restaurant back to their home, where they robbed them 
of the cash that they made that day. Id. at 236. The court reasoned that a small amount of cash stolen 
from private individuals in their home does not constitute an effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 239. 
 7 See United States v. Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling that the use of eBay to 
lure a victim into being robbed constituted an effect on interstate commerce, establishing Hobbs Act 
jurisdiction); see also Collins, 40 F.3d at 100 (expressing the concern that, without distinguishing 
between individuals and businesses, any robbery could constitute a federal crime). 
 8 See United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 526 n.2 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting in 
part) (providing a list of long federal prison sentences associated with robberies of less than $20,000 
that the government could have charged at the state level). 
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sentencing requirements of the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).9 For in-
stance, in 2001 in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit case United 
States v. McFarland, the defendant robbed four shops at gunpoint for approxi-
mately two thousand dollars.10 He received over ninety-seven years in prison 
without the possibility of parole, effectively a life sentence.11 Had the defend-
ant been convicted under Texas law, a state court could have sentenced him to 
as little as five years in prison.12 
Prosecutors at the federal level often seek mandatory heightened sentenc-
es under the Hobbs Act; federalizing all robberies that involve internet use 
could, therefore, significantly expand the caseload of the federal courts by 
bringing these cases within federal courts’ jurisdictions.13 In the U.S. judicial 
framework, federal courts are tasked with overseeing a small number of cases 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See id. at 526 (stating that defendants in Hobbs Act cases receive “humungous sentences” for 
armed robberies due to the sentencing requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)). Title 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) 
adds a consecutive minimum sentence that varies based on how a firearm is used in a robbery, as well 
as if it is the defendant’s first conviction under the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Courts, including the 
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, generally 
find that a Hobbs Act armed robbery is a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) because it 
involves the use of “physical force” to steal property from a person or business. See United States v. 
Gathercole, 795 F. App’x 985, 986 (8th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (finding that a Hobbs Act robbery 
constitutes a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A)); United States v. Hill, 890 F.3d 51, 
53 (2d Cir. 2018) (same); United States v. Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 292 (6th Cir. 2017) (same); United 
States v. Rivera, 847 F.3d 847, 848–49 (7th Cir. 2017) (same); United States v. Moreno, 665 F. App’x 
678, 681 (10th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Howard, 650 F. App’x 466, 468 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(same); see also 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (defining a “crime of violence” as one that “has as an ele-
ment the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of an-
other”).  
 10 264 F.3d 557, 557–58 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally divided court, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 
2002) (en banc). The defendant in United States v. McFarland, a 2001 case before the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, robbed four stores using a .25 caliber pistol. Id. A grand jury indicted 
him on one charge of committing a Hobbs Act robbery and on four counts of using a firearm during 
the performance of a felony. Id. at 558. 
 11 Id. As the court explained in McFarland, it sentenced the defendant to 210 months in prison 
under the Hobbs Act, 60 months for one of the gun charges, and 300 months for each of the remaining 
three gun charges. Id. This results in a sentence of 1,170 months in prison. Id. 
 12 Id. The relevant statute in Texas in McFarland granted judges the discretion to sentence de-
fendants convicted of first-degree crimes to between five and ninety-nine years in prison. TEX. PENAL 
CODE § 12.32 (2019). The court further noted that, even if the defendant received the highest possible 
sentence under state law of ninety-nine years, he still would have been available for parole after thirty 
years. McFarland, 264 F.3d at 558. 
 13 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 243 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how the expansion of the Hobbs Act into traditional state crimes affects the 
abilities of the federal courts to focus on matters that have defined their “vital historical role”); see 
also Andrew Perrin & Madhu Kumar, About Three-in-Ten U.S. Adults Say They Are Almost Constantly 
Online, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 25, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/25/americans-
going-online-almost-constantly/ [https://perma.cc/MBM3-GUGJ] (finding that 81% of Americans use 
the internet on a daily basis, with 28% of Americans using it “almost constantly”). 
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that tend to pose questions of national importance.14 This has generally rele-
gated the brunt of the criminal caseload to state courts, particularly for assault, 
robbery, and extortion.15 This delegation of cases provides federal courts, as 
well as federal prosecutors, with the time and resources to focus on more com-
plex cases and issues.16 The potential expansion of the Hobbs Act, therefore, 
could result in the diversion of federal judicial and prosecutorial resources to 
robberies that could be handled by the state courts.17 
Along with triggering a potential increase in the federal caseload, a 
broader interpretation of the Hobbs Act raises federalism concerns.18 If courts 
deem any use of the internet in the commission of a robbery to constitute an 
effect on interstate commerce, the Hobbs Act could apply to robberies of indi-
viduals, federalizing what have traditionally been state level crimes.19 This 
                                                                                                                           
 14 See William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of the Administration 
of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 677 (1994) (explaining that the federal court 
system is not crafted to handle a large caseload because it was designed to handle only certain types of 
cases). Some scholars emphasize that federal courts are meant to provide a forum for conflicts of 
nationwide importance. Id. at 682. 
 15 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 243 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (describing robbery, extortion, 
murder, and assault as crimes normally within the state courts’ realms). The dissenting opinion further 
noted that state courts handle “an overwhelming percentage” of the country’s litigation. Id. 
 16 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 684 (describing it as “inefficient and wasteful” for 
federal courts to use their limited resources on traditional state criminal cases). Some scholars reason 
that federal prosecutors should use their resources on the prosecution of traditional federal crimes, 
such as tax evasion and white-collar crimes, rather than on crimes that the state courts can handle. Id. 
 17 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 242–43 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (explaining that federal courts 
cannot properly function if they must oversee criminal cases normally handled by the state courts); 
Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 684 (acknowledging the practical limitations in forcing fed-
eral courts to handle traditional state crimes). There were 319,356 robberies in the United States in 
2017, which significantly exceeds the 81,553 criminal cases filed in U.S. district courts in 2018. See 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORT: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017: 
ROBBERY (2018), https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2017/crime-in-the-u.s.-2017/topic-pages/robbery.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2JDK-HUWA] (stating the number of robberies in the United States in 2017); 
Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2018, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2018 [https://perma.cc/5VTY-HYMY] (stating the number of crim-
inal fillings in U.S. district courts in 2018). 
 18 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 667–68 (describing how expansions in federal 
jurisdiction harm supposedly autonomous state functions); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (emphasizing the importance of differentiating between federal and local 
powers with regard to criminal laws). 
 19 See United States v. Lynch, 282 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that no circuit court 
“has rejected the distinction between” robberies of persons and businesses under the Hobbs Act), 
overruled on other grounds by 437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see also United States v. 
Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 2000) (ruling that the robbery of an individual does not always 
satisfy the interstate commerce clement of the Hobbs Act because, unlike with businesses, the aggre-
gation principle does not apply). The Ninth Circuit in 2002 in United States v. Lynch noted its concern 
that the federalizing of robberies of individuals would destroy any difference between what constitutes 
a federal offense and what constitutes a state one. 282 F.3d at 1054. Notably, the Supreme Court in 
the 1979 decision United States v. Culbert ruled that there is no constitutional issue with the Hobbs 
Act applying to cases that can also be prosecuted under state law. 435 U.S. 371, 379–80 (1979). 
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jurisdictional shift could undercut criminal justice policy as formulated by 
state legislatures, as well as disregard the experience of local judges who have 
long considered what the punishments should be for such an offense.20 
This Note contends that the use of the internet should not categorically 
constitute an effect on interstate commerce under the Hobbs Act.21 Rather, 
courts should adopt a functional test to determine whether the use of the inter-
net satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce element with a case-by-case inquiry.22 
To support Hobbs Act charges, this test would require robberies involving 
commercial websites, such as eBay and Craigslist, to always fulfill the Act’s 
commerce element.23 When robberies involve non-retail websites, courts 
should evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether the use of the internet was 
commercial in nature—for instance, the use of Google Maps in the mugging 
hypothetical would not satisfy the commerce element because it was not a 
commercial use.24 This construction of the Hobbs Act acknowledges the inter-
net’s role as a mechanism of interstate commerce, but also ensures that internet 
use does not automatically provide grounds for federal jurisdiction.25 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 668 (explaining the theory that, by allowing feder-
al criminal law to overlap with state criminal law, Congress can “override” the choices made by state 
officials about how to handle and punish those that commit a crime). Scholars note that the higher 
mandatory sentences for federal crimes can undermine state policies that have been made with regard 
to the respective crimes. Id. 
 21 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (prohibiting robberies and extortions that affect commerce “in any 
way or degree”); see also United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2020) (suggesting 
that internet use during a local robbery would not always satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element). 
 22 See Wang, 222 F.3d at 239–40 (outlining why robberies of individuals do not generally affect 
interstate commerce, but also stating that the court will nevertheless determine if there is a “nexus” 
between the robbery of the individual and interstate commerce). The functional view of the Wang 
court for examining the interstate element of the Hobbs Act for robberies of individuals can apply to 
the internet as well. See id. (stating that there could be “[o]ther avenues of proof” for proving that the 
robbery of an individual satisfied the commerce element of the Hobbs Act). 
 23 See United States v. Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that the defendant 
used eBay to commit the robbery). The Seventh Circuit in 2007 in United States v. Horne found that 
the use of eBay affected interstate commerce because the “buy and sell offers” made through the web-
site created “interstate transactions.” Id. at 1006. Similarly, in the 2017 Sixth Circuit decision United 
States v. Person, the defendant advertised automobiles on Craigslist, and would rob the buyers when 
they came to pick up the car. 714 F. App’x 547, 548 (6th Cir. 2017). The court in Person ruled that 
the government satisfied the commerce element of the Hobbs Act because the defendant’s crimes 
involved the internet. Id. at 551. 
 24 Compare Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 18:00 (describing Circuit Judge Bybee’s hypothet-
ical of whether a mugger using Google Maps to escape the crime scene would satisfy the commerce 
element of the Hobbs Act), with Horne, 474 F.3d at 1005 (explaining how the defendant used the 
commerce website of eBay to facilitate his robberies). 
 25 See Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 18:00 (questioning whether the use of the internet could, 
standing alone, establish federal jurisdiction over a robbery); see also United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 
F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 2007) (deeming the internet to be “intimately related to interstate commerce”). 
Several circuit courts of appeals, including the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, 
have found the internet to be a channel and instrumentality of interstate commerce. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 
at 953; United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United States v. 
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Part I of this Note examines the legal landscape surrounding the com-
merce element of the Hobbs Act, and how courts have viewed the use of the 
internet in Hobbs Act prosecutions.26 Part II discusses the arguments for and 
against a categorical rule that internet use should always satisfy the Hobbs 
Act’s commerce element, as well as the underlying policy considerations.27 
Part III proposes that courts adopt a functional test for determining whether 
internet use in a particular case satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce clement.28 
I. UNPACKING THE HOBBS ACT, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE, AND  
ROBBERIES INVOLVING THE INTERNET 
This Part illustrates the governing doctrines and case law that are necessary 
for determining when the internet can establish federal jurisdiction under the 
Hobbs Act.29 Section A of Part I introduces the Hobbs Act and its commerce el-
ement.30 Section B examines the progression of Commerce Clause case law.31 
Sections C and D describe the differing interpretations of the Hobbs Act’s com-
merce element in relation to the Commerce Clause case law.32 Section E exam-
ines the Supreme Court’s latest Hobbs Act jurisprudence and how it diverts from 
prior Hobbs Act case law.33 Section F analyzes the few instances in which courts 
have interpreted the role of the internet in Hobbs Act prosecutions.34 
A. The Hobbs Act and Its Interstate Commerce Requirement 
The Hobbs Act has vastly expanded since its enactment in 1946.35 Con-
gress first passed the Hobbs Act to address the specific problem of highway 
robbery.36 In the early twentieth century, labor unions in cities along the East 
                                                                                                                           
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006); United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 450 (6th Cir. 
2006); United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 26 See infra notes 29–172 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 173–239 and accompanying text. 
 28 See infra notes 240–263 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 35–172 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 35–46 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 47–98 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 99–147 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 148–154 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 155–172 and accompanying text. 
 35 See United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 244 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., specially concur-
ring) (noting that Congress passed the Hobbs Act to address highway robberies, but also identifying 
that the Act now applies to many local robberies that do not occur on highways); see also Alexander 
M. Parker, Note, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J. 819, 822, 826 (1996) (stating 
that “almost any act of extortion” can be a federal crime under the Hobbs Act and that Congress did 
not intend for the Hobbs Act to reach so broadly). 
 36 Miles, 122 F.3d at 244 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring). The congressional hearings for the 
Hobbs Act focused on “extortion” and “paying of tribute” on interstate highways. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. 
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Coast would obstruct trucks and require them to pay a fee in order to enter the 
city.37 Despite Congress’s purported objective to address these specific union-
related crimes, the language of the Hobbs Act omitted any reference to high-
ways or highway robberies.38 The statute instead prohibited acts of “robbery or 
extortion” that interfered with articles of commerce “in any way or degree.”39 
Interpreting this language, the United States Supreme Court ruled in 
1960, in Stirone v. United States, that the Hobbs Act was an expression of 
Congress’s full constitutional power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit 
robberies that disrupt interstate commerce.40 In 1978, the Supreme Court fur-
ther expanded the reach of the Act in United States v. Culbert, when it ruled 
that the Hobbs Act applied to any robberies that fit within the realm of the stat-
ute’s language, including robberies that would also fall within the purview of 
state law.41 The federal government could, therefore, prosecute any robbery 
under the Hobbs Act, so long as it affected interstate commerce.42 
The government must prove two elements in every Hobbs Act prosecu-
tion.43 First, it must prove that an individual either attempted or completed an act 
                                                                                                                           
§ 1951(a) (addressing the interference of “any article or commodity in commerce” that “affects” inter-
state commerce). 
 37 Miles, 122 F.3d at 244 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring). These inbound trucks were often 
carrying vegetables and other produce from other states. Id. Unions would force the truck drivers to 
either pay the equivalent of a day’s salary for a union truck driver, or hire a union member to drive the 
shipment into the city. Id. 
 38 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects com-
merce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts 
or conspires so to do.”). 
 39 Id. There is no evidence as to why Congress included the phrase “in any way or degree,” nor as 
to what meaning Congress intended those words to carry. Miles, 122 F.3d at 244 (DeMoss, J., special-
ly concurring). The Hobbs Act defines robbery as the “unlawful taking or obtaining of personal prop-
erty from the person or in the presence of another, against his will.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1). It further 
defines extortion as “the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful 
use of actual or threatened force.” Id. § 1951(b)(2). 
 40 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960). The Supreme Court’s 1960 opinion Stirone v. United States involved 
a powerful labor union official convicted under the Hobbs Act for extorting the owner of a concrete 
business. Id. at 213. The defendant threatened to interfere with the concrete business’s contract to 
build a steel mill, unless the concrete business owner paid him off. Id. at 213–14. 
 41 435 U.S. 371, 379–80 (1978) (stating that Congress hoped to address the states’ ineffectiveness 
in prosecuting robberies and extortions by allowing the federal government to prosecute these ac-
tions). 
 42 See id. (ruling that Congress passed the Hobbs Act to address any robberies or extortions that 
meet the statute’s language); see also United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2001) 
(explaining that a Hobbs Act robbery mandates that “two elements be proven: robbery and an effect 
on interstate commerce”), abrogated on other grounds by Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074 
(2016). “Interstate commerce” generally concerns all of the aspects of “commercial intercourse be-
tween different states.” Interstate Commerce, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990). 
 43 United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1997); see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (pro-
hibiting robbery, extortion, or attempted robbery or extortion that “obstructs” interstate commerce). In 
United States v. Robinson, the government charged the defendant under the Hobbs Act for robbing the 
owners and employees of check-cashing businesses immediately after they made check withdrawals. 
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of robbery.44 Second, the government must prove a disruption of interstate 
commerce.45 In evaluating what can and should satisfy the commerce element 
in a Hobbs Act prosecution, it is first necessary to examine how the Supreme 
Court expanded, and later restricted, Congress’s power to regulate through the 
Commerce Clause.46 
B. The Commerce Clause and Its Ever-Developing Case Law 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall 
have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”47 The Commerce Clause is the only 
enumerated power that Congress possesses to regulate businesses and mar-
kets.48 After the Articles of Confederation failed to give the national govern-
ment power over trade, the Constitutional Convention designed the Commerce 
Clause to afford the federal government power over commerce between the 
states.49 As the United States economy expanded over the next two centuries, 
courts in turn expanded the Commerce Clause to afford Congress greater regu-
latory power by expanding what constitutes “commerce.”50 
1. The Commerce Clause and Its Early Interpretations 
In 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, the Supreme Court defined commerce as 
“intercourse,” and ruled that Congress could regulate commerce that affects 
                                                                                                                           
119 F.3d at 1208. The defendant would rob business owners and employees as they made check with-
drawals from a bank drive-through, or would rob them when they returned to the business premises 
from the bank. Id. In total, the defendant stole approximately seventy thousand dollars from three 
different businesses. Id. at 1209. 
 44 Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See id. at 1209–10 (examining the Commerce Clause case law to determine the proper standard 
for applying the commerce element in a Hobbs Act prosecution). In making its determination, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit examined Commerce Clause case law that spanned from the 
1940s to the 2000s. Id. at 1209–10, 1214–15. 
 47 U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, cl. 3. 
 48 See Robert L. Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. 
REV. 1335, 1340 (1934) (stating that the Commerce Clause provides the only source of power that 
Congress has to govern “trade”). 
 49 Id. at 1337–38. In fact, the Founders called the Constitutional Convention in large part due to 
the failure of the Articles of Confederation to afford the national government the power to oversee 
interstate commerce. Id. at 1337. 
 50 See U.S. Dep’t of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491, 499 (1993) (“The emergence of an intercon-
nected and interdependent national economy, however, prompted a more expansive jurisprudential 
image of interstate commerce.”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585–90 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining the Constitution’s Founders’ original interpretation of “com-
merce,” and suggesting that the case law has taken too expansive a view of what “commerce” is). 
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more than one state.51 Gibbons, however, did not specify what constitutes in-
terstate activity that Congress can regulate.52 The Supreme Court first ad-
dressed this question in Champion v. Ames in 1903, and found that Congress 
has “plenary” power under the Commerce Clause to regulate the transportation 
of goods across state lines.53 In the decades following Champion, the Court 
hesitated to expand the scope of federal regulation under the Commerce 
Clause.54 For example, in 1918 in Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Supreme Court 
struck down a federal law that prohibited the interstate shipment of goods pro-
duced by factories that employed child labor.55 The Court reasoned that Con-
gress could not use the Commerce Clause as a pretext to regulate employment 
conditions within states, even if the statute regulated the interstate transporta-
tion of goods.56 The Court further clarified that the production of goods did not 
constitute commerce, regardless of whether those items later crossed state 
boundaries.57 Although the Court narrowly interpreted the Commerce Clause 
in these early cases, its rulings in the coming decades greatly expanded Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause Power and ultimately laid the groundwork for the 
expansion of the Hobbs Act.58 
                                                                                                                           
 51 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189, 194 (1824). Notably, the Supreme Court in the 1824 case Gibbons v. 
Ogden ruled that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is “complete in itself, [and] may be 
exercised to its utmost extent.” Id. at 196.  
 52 See id. at 194–95 (explaining that internal commerce of the state falls under state power and all 
other commerce falls under federal authority, but not clarifying which commerce is internal to a state). 
 53 188 U.S. 321, 362–63 (1903). In addressing a statute that prohibited the transportation of lot-
tery tickets between states, the Supreme Court established that Congress could prohibit articles of 
commerce from traveling across state boundaries. Id. 
 54 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303–04 (1936) (stating that Congress could not 
promulgate labor regulations for coal miners under the Commerce Clause because such laws are relat-
ed to the production, not transportation, of goods); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495, 548, 550 (1935) (finding that the hours and pay of employees could not be regulated 
because they did not directly affect interstate commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–
72 (1918) (ruling that Congress could not prohibit the transportation of goods produced by child labor 
under its commerce power because such restrictions could only be regulated locally), overruled by 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 55 247 U.S. at 276–77. 
 56 Id. at 271–72. The Court stated that regulating interstate movement of goods is acceptable 
when the interstate movement itself is “harmful.” Id. at 271. At the same time, the Court prohibited 
Congress from regulating interstate movement of goods solely because the production of the goods 
within a state is “harmful.” Id. at 272. 
 57 Id. at 272. 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying a de 
minimis standard to the interstate commerce clement of Hobbs Act prosecutions, which is based on 
the aggregation principle established by the Supreme Court in 1942); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (ruling that a seemingly minimal action could constitute an effect on inter-
state commerce when that action, considered in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce). 
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2. The Expansion of the Commerce Clause Power in the New Deal and 
Civil Rights Eras 
At the height of the Great Depression, the Supreme Court adopted a more 
expansive view of the Commerce Clause.59 In 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court ruled that activities with a “close and substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce” fall under the realm of the Commerce 
Clause, even if those actions appear to be intrastate when viewed in isolation.60 
In analyzing a federal law that protected the right to unionize, the Court in 
Jones & Laughlin Steel focused on the effect of unionized labor on interstate 
commerce, and dismissed the fact that the employees in question participated 
in product manufacturing.61 In 1941, as American involvement in World War II 
loomed, the Supreme Court further expanded the Commerce Clause’s power in 
United States v. Darby, ruling that Congress possessed the power to regulate 
the transportation of manufactured items.62 
The Supreme Court, in its 1942 Wickard v. Filburn decision, elaborated 
on what constituted a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce.”63 
The case involved a farmer fined by the federal government for producing 
wheat on his farm in excess of federal regulations.64 He subsequently chal-
lenged the regulation on the basis that the Commerce Clause could not extend 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (finding that activities could 
affect commerce so long as they have a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce”). The 
1937 Supreme Court case NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel involved a dispute over whether the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board could require a private steel company to rehire its striking workers under 
the Wagner Act. Id. at 22. The Court explicitly recognized the far-reaching, negative effects that such 
a strike would have on the nation’s economy. Id. at 41 (“It is obvious that [the effect on interstate 
commerce] would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”). 
 60 Id. at 37. The Court used the example of carriers that transport items both intrastate and inter-
state. Id. at 37–38. Congress can regulate these carriers, the Court reasoned, because such regulation is 
necessary to protect interstate traffic and ensure efficiency. Id. 
 61 Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (ruling that Congress could not 
regulate employment conditions for coal miners because it involved the production, not transportation, 
of goods), with Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 40 (stating that the unionized labor’s participation 
in the production of the items was not decisive). 
 62 312 U.S. 100, 113 (1941). The ruling overturned the Court’s 1918 Hammer v. Dagenhart deci-
sion by stating that Congress could use the Commerce Clause as pretext to regulate goods that it finds 
harmful. Id. at 114, 116–17 (“[Congress] is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in 
the states for which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals or 
welfare, even though the state has not sought to regulate their use.”); see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 
U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918) (ruling that Congress could not use interstate commerce as pretext to regu-
late the production of goods), overruled by Darby, 312 U.S. 100. 
 63 See 317 U.S. at 125 (stating that, even if an activity occurs intrastate, Congress can regulate it 
if it has a “substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”); see also Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 
U.S. at 37 (explaining that activities that appear entirely local can be regulated by Congress if they 
have a “close and substantial relation to interstate commerce”). 
 64 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 114–15. The farmer produced wheat on his farm to either sell or feed to 
his livestock. Id. at 114. 
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to the intrastate growth and consumption of wheat.65 The Court upheld the fed-
eral regulations because, even if the farmer’s contribution to interstate com-
merce was minimal, the contribution of farmers in the aggregate had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.66 The ruling established the aggregation 
doctrine, which maintains that Congress can regulate intrastate activities that, 
when taken in the aggregate, substantially affect commerce.67 
Two decades following Wickard, Congress used its Commerce Clause 
power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1964.68 That same year, in Heart of At-
lanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s use of 
its Commerce Clause power to pass the Civil Rights Act, on the grounds that 
discrimination against African Americans obstructs interstate commerce.69 
Specifically, the ruling held that Congress could regulate local activities, such 
as racial discrimination in motels, when those activities have a substantial im-
pact on interstate commerce.70 
Similarly, in a second 1964 Civil Rights Act Supreme Court case Katzen-
bach v. McClung, the Court ruled that Congress could regulate discrimination 
in a local restaurant because the restaurant purchased a portion of its meat from 
outside of the state.71 The Court justified its ruling by using the aggregation 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. at 119. 
 66 Id. at 127–28. The Court noted that the objective of the regulation at issue in Wickard v. Fil-
burn was to drive up the price of wheat. Id. at 128. Congress, therefore, could regulate the production 
of wheat because it would substantially affect the interstate market demand for wheat. Id. at 128–29. 
 67 See id. at 127–29 (finding that the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate an intra-
state activity when that activity, in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce); see also United States 
v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying the aggregation principle to uphold 
the de minimis standard for establishing Hobbs Act jurisdiction). 
 68 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964) (stating that Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 through its power to regulate commerce); see also Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (ensuring “equal access” in certain public forums by prohibit-
ing discrimination based on race). 
 69 379 U.S. at 257, 261. The Court relied on congressional testimony that racial discrimination 
forced many African Americans to travel farther distances in order to receive accommodations. Id. at 
252–53. 
 70 Id. at 258. The motel at issue in the 1964 Supreme Court case Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. 
United States refused to allow African Americans to inhabit the motel. Id. at 243. Notably, the motel 
had 216 rooms, was located near several interstate highways, advertised nationally, and 75% of its 
customers were from other states. Id. The Court, therefore, found that the policies of the motel affect-
ed interstate travelers by refusing to serve them on the basis of race. Id. at 258, 261. 
 71 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). The restaurant in question annually purchased approximately 
$70,000 of food that originated from other states. Id. at 298. There was, however, no evidence that any 
of the restaurant’s customers were from outside of the state. Id. Unlike its emphasis on interstate trav-
elers in Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court in 1964 in Katzenbach v. McClung looked to congressional 
testimony that discrimination in restaurants had a substantial impact on interstate commerce in the 
aggregate. Id. at 299. Compare Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258 (finding that commerce was 
affected because interstate travelers could not reside at the motel at issue), with McClung, 379 U.S. at 
299 (emphasizing that racial discrimination in restaurants was an economic issue with far-reaching 
implications). 
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principle established in Wickard, and reasoned that restaurants on the whole 
sold less food because of racial discrimination.72 But unlike prior Commerce 
Clause rulings, the majority opinion in McClung emphasized Congress’s pow-
er under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact any laws related to the regu-
lation of interstate commerce.73 The Supreme Court, ultimately, extended this 
principle even further in 1969, in Daniel v. Paul, wherein the Court found that 
a local snack bar in Arkansas affected interstate commerce because the ingre-
dients in its bread came from other states.74 This era of Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence created crucial precedents for assessing the interstate commerce 
element of a Hobbs Act prosecution.75 
3. Scaling Back the Commerce Clause Power: The Lopez Era 
The legal landscape of Commerce Clause jurisprudence shifted in 1995 
with the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Lopez.76 The Court in 
Lopez struck down a federal law that prohibited an individual from knowingly 
possessing a firearm in a school zone.77 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s 
                                                                                                                           
 72 McClung, 379 U.S. at 300–01. The aggregation principle in Wickard established that Congress 
could regulate intrastate activities with seemingly minimal effect on interstate commerce when those 
activities have a substantial impact in the aggregate. See 317 U.S. 111, 127–28 (1942) (finding that 
one farmer’s growing and consuming of wheat may have a “trivial” effect in isolation, but many 
farmers doing the same would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 73 McClung, 379 U.S. at 301–02 (stating that Congress could pass any legislation that is “neces-
sary and proper” for regulating interstate commerce); see also U.S. CONST. art. l, § 8, cl. 18 (granting 
Congress the power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers”). 
 74 See 395 U.S. 298, 305 (1969) (ruling that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied to a snack bar in 
Arkansas because “three of the four food items sold contain[ed] ingredients originating from outside 
of the State”). The snack bar at issue in the Supreme Court’s 1969 decision Daniel v. Paul served four 
items on its menu: hamburgers and hot dogs with buns, soda, and milk. Id. The Court found that the 
food sold by the snack bar affected interstate commerce because the ingredients in the buns were from 
outside of the state, and that some of the ingredients in the soda were “probably” from outside of the 
state. Id. 
 75 See United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (5th Cir. 1997) (relying on the aggre-
gation principle established in Wickard to rule that a de minimis standard is appropriate in Hobbs Act 
prosecutions). The Fifth Circuit in Robinson voiced its concerns that moving away from the aggrega-
tion principle in Wickard “would be call[ing] into question” the rulings regarding civil rights legisla-
tion that relied on the expanded Commerce Clause power. Id. at 1214; see McClung, 379 U.S. at 300–
01 (using the aggregation principle established in Wickard to find that Congress could regulate racial 
discrimination in restaurants, even if instances of discrimination in that particular restaurant did not 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 76 See 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (holding that Congress did not have the power under the Com-
merce Clause to regulate the possession of firearms in schools); see also John Schreiner, The Irony of 
the Ninth Circuit’s Expanded (Ab)Use of the Commerce Clause, 33 W. STATE U. L. REV. 13, 17 
(2005) (stating that the Supreme Court’s 1995 decision in United States v. Lopez “has become a high-
water mark in Commerce Clause case law”). 
 77 514 U.S. at 551; see Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (prohibit-
ing a person from knowingly possessing a firearm in a school zone). 
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majority opinion reasoned that the act of possessing a firearm in a school zone 
did not substantially affect interstate commerce.78 Unlike the wheat in Wickard 
or the restaurant in McClung, the handling of a firearm in a school zone was 
not economic, and could not, even through aggregation, have a substantial im-
pact on interstate commerce.79 
The Court in Lopez emphasized the importance of federalism and state 
power, and minimized in this context Congress’s power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.80 In arguing that possession of a firearm in a school zone 
substantially affects commerce, the government in Lopez claimed that violent 
crime has significant costs that reach the whole population through insurance 
premiums.81 The Court rejected this argument on the basis that such reasoning 
could give Congress the power to prohibit crimes under the Commerce Clause 
that were historically within the realm of the states.82 The government further 
argued that possession of a firearm in a school zone threatened the nation’s 
learning environments, leading to a less educated citizenry that would conse-
quently be less economically productive.83 The Court reiterated that such logic 
would afford Congress infinite power over a matter normally left to state and 
local governments—the regulation of public schools.84 
The Lopez ruling ultimately recognized three groups of activities that 
Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause.85 The first two categories, 
channels of interstate commerce and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, 
                                                                                                                           
 78 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567 (stating that, even in the aggregate, possession of a firearm in a school 
zone does not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce). 
 79 Id.; see McClung, 379 U.S. at 304 (finding that a restaurant buying meat from other states 
could, in the aggregate, create a substantial impact on interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (holding that Congress could regulate the amount of wheat that a farmer 
grows and consumes on his own farm due to the substantial effect that it has on interstate commerce 
in the aggregate). 
 80 Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (explaining the Constitution’s enumeration of powers and the 
Framers’ intentions regarding state powers), with McClung, 379 U.S. at 301–02 (beginning its analy-
sis of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause by stating that the Constitution grants Congress 
the ability to enact “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to regulate interstate commerce 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8)). 
 81 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563–64. 
 82 Id. at 564. The Court in Lopez emphasized the significance of state powers throughout the 
opinion. Id. at 552. The Court specifically quoted The Federalist Papers: “The powers delegated by 
the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain 
in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.” Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 292 
(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 83 Id. at 564. 
 84 Id. at 565. Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the opinion for the Court and explained that if the 
Court accepted the government’s reasoning, then Congress would be able to create a “federal curricu-
lum” because the lessons presented in classrooms have an “effect on classroom learning.” Id. 
 85 Id. at 558. 
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involve inherently interstate activities that Congress can always regulate.86 The 
last group constitutes activities that have a “substantial relation to interstate 
commerce.”87 The Court acknowledged that this third group could include in-
trastate activities, but only if such activities are economic in nature and sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.88 
In examining the third category of activities established in Lopez, in 2000 
the Supreme Court, in United States v. Morrison, struck down a federal crimi-
nal statute that prohibited gender-motivated violence.89 The Court held that 
Congress could not use its Commerce Clause power to prohibit noneconomic, 
violent crimes on the grounds that such activity affects interstate conduct in the 
aggregate.90 Similar to the ruling in Lopez, the opinion in Morrison empha-
sized the preservation of state and local power.91 The Court emphasized its 
Lopez reasoning that if the Commerce Clause permits the punishment of any 
crime that has an aggregate effect on commerce, then Congress would possess 
the power to regulate almost all crimes.92 
                                                                                                                           
 86 Id. Congress can regulate the abuse of channels of interstate commerce, such as the transporta-
tion of stolen items or kidnapping. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). Secondly, Con-
gress can govern instrumentalities, such as by prohibiting robbery of shipped goods. Id. 
 87 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59. 
 88 Id. at 559–60. The Court, in demonstrating examples of intrastate activities that were economic 
and substantially affected interstate commerce, cites the restaurant in McClung, the motel in Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, and the wheat in Wickard. Id.; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 
U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (stating that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to regulate motels 
that serve interstate travelers); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1964) (finding that 
Congress could regulate a local restaurant because racial discrimination in restaurants affects interstate 
commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (ruling that Congress could regulate the 
amount of wheat produced on a farm); see also Mark D. Rosen, Marijuana, State Extraterritoriality, 
and Congress, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1013, 1020 (2017) (stating that Congress can regulate only economic 
activities under the third Lopez group). 
 89 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000) (finding that Congress did not have the power under the Commerce 
Clause to enact such a statute); see Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (prohib-
iting gender-motivated crimes against women). Congress made findings that gender-motivated crimes 
substantially affect interstate commerce: one million women seek medical assistance from injuries 
caused by their male partners each year, violent crimes against women cost the country around $3 
billion per year, and the United States spends between $5 billion and $10 billion annually on the crim-
inal, social, and medical costs associated with domestic violence. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 632 (Souter, 
J., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the effect that gender-motivated violence 
has on the national economy, it struck down the law to preserve state power over criminal law. Id. at 
615–18 (majority opinion). 
 90 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617. The ruling explicitly declined to adopt a categorical rule that none-
conomic conduct could not be considered in the aggregate. Id. at 613. 
 91 See id. at 617–18 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568) (“The Constitution requires a distinction be-
tween what is truly national and what is truly local.”). 
 92 Id. at 615. The Court worried that permitting such an expansion of the Commerce Clause 
would allow Congress to prohibit murder, as well as any other violent crime. Id. It further noted that 
punishing violent crime is a quintessential state power. Id. at 618. 
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Finally, in a recent twist, the Court departed from the trend of judicially 
restricting the Commerce Clause’s reach.93 In 2005, in Gonzalez v. Raich, the 
Supreme Court upheld a federal drug regulation on the basis that the intrastate 
production and selling of controlled substances is part of a larger market that 
substantially impacts interstate commerce.94 Unlike the rulings in Lopez and 
Morrison, the Court in Raich followed McClung’s precedent of emphasizing 
Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.95 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia reasoned that Congress 
possesses the power to regulate noneconomic intrastate activities when the pol-
icies are part of a broader plan of interstate regulation.96 Justice Scalia further 
explained that Congress could regulate noneconomic local activities under the 
Commerce Clause when the absence of regulation would “undercut” Con-
gress’s regulation of interstate commerce.97 Although the Court reverted to its 
pre-Lopez jurisprudence in Raich, the rulings in Lopez and Morrison raised 
questions concerning what constitutes a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce in a Hobbs Act case and how courts should consider the balance of fed-
eral and state power when interpreting the Hobbs Act.98 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (ruling that Congress possessed the power under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate controlled substances, even when they were produced and consumed 
in the same state). 
 94 Id. at 25–26. 
 95 Id. at 5; see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–02 (1964) (outlining Congress’s pow-
er under the Necessary and Proper Clause). Compare Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (beginning its Commerce 
Clause analysis by emphasizing the federal government’s enumerated powers in contrast with the 
powers of states), with Raich, 545 U.S. at 5 (starting the opinion with a description of Congress’s 
power under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause). 
 96 Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Congress may regulate even noneconomic local 
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.”). 
 97 Id. at 38. Justice Scalia specifically states in his concurrence that prior Supreme Court Com-
merce Clause rulings do not categorically prohibit the regulation of noneconomic intrastate actions. 
Id. at 38–39. He further clarified that such actions do not fall under the third Lopez category of sub-
stantially burdening interstate commerce. Id. at 38; see Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (stating that Con-
gress can regulate activities that substantially relate to interstate commerce). 
 98 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (stating that the test for congressional regulations is whether an 
“activity ‘substantially affects’ interstate commerce”); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 
598, 617 (2000) (finding that Congress could not rely on the aggregation principle to regulate violent 
crimes that are noneconomic in nature). The opinions in Lopez and United States v. Morrison empha-
sized the importance of restricting the federal government to its enumerated powers in order to pre-
serve state power. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617–18 (stating that the Court needs to distinguish be-
tween the “truly national” and the “truly local”); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552 (describing the federal gov-
ernment’s powers as “few and defined,” and that all other governing powers remain with the states). 
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C. The Relationship Between the Hobbs Act and the Commerce  
Clause in Local Robberies99 
In applying the interstate commerce requirement of the Hobbs Act, circuit 
courts of appeals have relied primarily on the Supreme Court’s larger framework 
for interpreting the Commerce Clause.100 Despite the narrowing of the Com-
merce Clause power in Morrison and Lopez, circuit courts have repeatedly held 
that a showing of a de minimis effect on interstate commerce is sufficient to sat-
isfy the commerce element of a Hobbs Act prosecution.101 Accordingly, rob-
beries under the Hobbs Act do not necessarily need to have a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce, even when they occur entirely intrastate.102 
In upholding local robbery prosecutions under the Lopez formulation, 
courts have adopted two approaches.103 Some circuits, including the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, have simply ruled that the substantial effect test established in Lopez does 
not apply to Hobbs Act robberies.104 Other circuits, such as the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
have held that robbery or extortion fall under the third Lopez category requiring 
a substantial relation to interstate commerce.105 These courts, however, do not 
                                                                                                                           
 99 This Note defines “local robberies” as those robberies that do not take place on an interstate 
highway nor directly obstruct the movement of goods between states. “Local robberies” are intrastate 
robberies that fall under the third Lopez category of having a “substantial relation to interstate com-
merce.” See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (describing Congress’s power to regulate activities that “sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce”). 
 100 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1214–15 (5th Cir. 1997) (determining a 
standard for courts to evaluate the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act through application 
of the New Deal Era Commerce Clause case law to the Court’s ruling in Lopez). 
 101 See United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that every circuit court 
that has ruled on the issue has applied a de minimis standard to the interstate commerce element of a 
Hobbs Act prosecution). The de minimis effect test requires only that the action in question had a 
small or “minimal” effect on interstate commerce. See, e.g., United States v. Harding, 563 F.2d 299, 
302 (6th Cir. 1977) (describing the de minimis standard as requiring “no more than a minimal effect 
on interstate commerce”). 
 102 See, e.g., United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 711 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that courts 
need to apply a de minimis standard to Hobbs Act robberies, which the prosecution can satisfy 
through the aggregation principle). 
 103 See Kelly D. Miller, The Hobbs Act, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and United States v. 
McFarland: The Irrational Aggregation of Independent Local Robberies to Sustain Federal Convic-
tions, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1761, 1766–67 (2002) (explaining that courts have used two methods in apply-
ing the Hobbs Act to local robberies); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (listing the three groups of 
activities that Congress can regulate under the Commerce Clause). 
 104 Miller, supra note 103, at 1766–67; see United States v. Harrington, 108 F.3d 1460, 1467 
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (stating that courts do not need to find a “substantial” effect in a Hobbs Act prosecu-
tion); United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1242–43 (9th Cir. 1996) (same). 
 105 See Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711 (explaining that some courts have placed Hobbs Act robberies in 
the third category of Lopez); Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212 (applying Hobbs Act robberies under the 
third category of Lopez, and stating that they can be satisfied through the aggregation principle); Unit-
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require a showing that the specific robbery substantially affected interstate com-
merce.106 They instead apply the aggregation principle established in Wickard to 
find that robbery has a substantial effect on interstate commerce in the aggre-
gate.107 Either interpretation empowers the government to prosecute robberies of 
any business under the Hobbs Act.108 Nonetheless, courts hesitate to apply this 
aggregate reasoning when the victim of the robbery is an individual, in effect 
limiting Hobbs Act prosecutions to the robberies of businesses.109 
Although Lopez marked a significant shift in the Supreme Court’s Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence, Lopez did not impact circuit courts’ approach to 
analyzing the interstate commerce element of Hobbs Act prosecutions.110 The 
circuit courts distinguish the Hobbs Act from the Gun-Free School Zone Act in 
Lopez, insofar as the acts of robbery and extortion in the aggregate substantially 
affect interstate commerce.111 They reason that robbery has an “obvious” inter-
                                                                                                                           
ed States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) (same); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 
(describing congressional power to regulate activities that substantially impact interstate commerce). 
 106 See Clausen, 328 F.3d at 711 (stating that the Hobbs Act requires only a de minimis standard). 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits apply this same reason-
ing. See Smith, 182 F.3d at 456 (requiring a de minimis, rather than a substantial, effect on interstate 
commerce in each case); Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212 (same); Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399 (same); United 
States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (7th Cir. 1995) (same). 
 107 Miller, supra note 103, at 1768; see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–29 (1942) (stating 
that Congress could regulate local activities when those activities have a “substantial effect” on inter-
state commerce in the aggregate). 
 108 See Clausen, 328 F.3d at 710–11 (explaining how both methods applied by courts require a de 
minimis standard that robberies of businesses always satisfy); see also Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1215 
(explaining that the robberies of retail stores, taken in the aggregate across the country, would certain-
ly have a substantial impact on interstate commerce). The aggregation principle is applied to robberies 
of businesses both because those businesses buy and sell goods from other states, and also because 
robberies of businesses in the aggregate would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See, 
e.g., Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1215 (explaining how the aggregation principle can be applied to busi-
nesses that import supplies from other states and also how robberies of retail stores across the country 
would substantially affect interstate commerce). 
 109 See United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 2002) (differentiating the robbery or 
extortion of an individual from the robbery or extortion of a business to satisfy the commerce ele-
ment); United States v. Lynch, 282 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), overruled on other 
grounds by 437 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. Collins, 40 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir. 
1994) (distinguishing individuals and businesses with regard to the commerce element to ensure that 
not every robbery or extortion could be charged federally). Courts have reasoned that robberies of 
individuals often do not exhibit the direct effect on interstate commerce that robberies of businesses 
do. See, e.g., Collins, 40 F.3d at 100–01 (“[I]t is manifest that Congress may not regulate conduct that, 
standing alone, does not directly affect interstate commerce or have a direct effect on a business en-
gaged in interstate commerce.”). 
 110 See Clausen, 328 F.3d at 710 (stating that, even after Lopez, circuit courts continued to hold 
that individual crimes under the Hobbs Act did not need to substantially affect commerce). 
 111 See, e.g., Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1215 (reasoning that the “cumulative result” of robberies and 
extortions under the Hobbs Act has a substantial impact on interstate commerce). The court distin-
guished the Hobbs Act from the Gun-Free School Zone Act at issue in Lopez by stating that, unlike 
robbery, the act of possessing a gun in a school does not have an aggregate effect on interstate com-
merce. Id. 
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state effect because it involves taking money or items from businesses involved 
in interstate trade.112 These courts further identify that, unlike the Hobbs Act, the 
federal law in Lopez did not contain an express jurisdictional element requiring 
an effect on interstate commerce.113 Specifically, the Supreme Court in Lopez 
took issue with the Gun-Free School Zones Act for not including a jurisdictional 
element because that eliminated any need to examine on a case-by-case basis 
whether possessing a firearm in a specific instance affected interstate com-
merce.114 
Following Morrison’s ruling that Congress could not regulate noneconomic 
criminal activity based on its aggregate effect, circuit courts still maintained the 
de minimis standard.115 These courts held that Morrison did not affect their prior 
interpretations of the Hobbs Act because the law at issue in Morrison was simi-
lar to the law in Lopez.116 The courts found that, unlike the law in Morrison that 
addressed violence against women, or the law in Lopez that prohibited posses-
sion of guns in school zones, the Hobbs Act fundamentally regulates economic 
activity and thus appropriately demands application of the aggregation princi-
ple.117 The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States 
v. Peterson additionally identified that the law in Morrison criminalized all gen-
der-motivated violence, irrespective of such conduct’s effect on interstate com-
                                                                                                                           
 112 See, e.g., id. at 1212–13 (stating that a robbery takes the funds that a business would have 
otherwise used to make interstate purchases and sales). 
 113 Id. at 1211; see 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990) (including no express jurisdictional element). 
An express jurisdictional element in a Commerce Clause statute explicitly mandates an effect on inter-
state commerce for each act or crime. Miller, supra note 103, at 1767. The Hobbs Act contains an 
express jurisdictional element for interstate commerce with the requirement that the robbery or extor-
tion affect commerce “in any way or degree.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018). Conversely, the statute at 
issue in Lopez did not explicitly require that the possession of a gun in a school zone affect interstate 
commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990) (creating a federal offense “for any individual know-
ingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a 
school zone”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562 (1995) (finding that the language of 
the statute did not require that a certain set of firearm possessions affect interstate commerce). 
 114 514 U.S. at 561–62. A jurisdictional element requires a case-by-case analysis because it mandates 
an effect on interstate commerce as one of the elements of the crime. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2018) 
(requiring the robbery or extortion to interfere with commerce). 
 115 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 236 F.3d 848, 852 (7th Cir. 2001) (ruling that Morrison 
did not affect the constitutionality of the de minimis standard in Hobbs Act prosecutions), abrogated 
on other grounds by Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074 (2016); United States v. Malone, 222 
F.3d 1286, 1295 (10th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 116 Miller, supra note 103, at 1769–70 (explaining how the Tenth Circuit found that Morrison did 
not affect its prior Hobbs Act decisions because Morrison relied heavily on Lopez). Compare 18 
U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990) (outlawing the possession of a gun in a school zone), and 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981 (1994) (prohibiting gender-motivated violence), with 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018) (forbidding 
robbery or extortion that “affects” interstate commerce “in any way or degree”). 
 117 See, e.g., Malone, 222 F.3d at 1295 (reasoning that the laws in Lopez and Morrison were simi-
lar in that they both addressed “non-economic criminal conduct”). 
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merce.118 The Hobbs Act, meanwhile, prohibited only criminal activities with a 
“proven effect” on interstate commerce.119 
Courts upholding the de minimis standard have generally overlooked 
Lopez’s emphasis on preserving powers generally left to the states.120 In United 
States v. Robinson, the Fifth Circuit noted Lopez’s concerns for enumerated 
powers and conservation of traditional state powers, but still deferred to Con-
gress’s ability to regulate commerce under the Necessary and Proper Clause.121 
The Fifth Circuit in Robinson further shared its concern that interpreting Lopez’s 
third category to require a substantial effect on interstate commerce in each indi-
vidual case could jeopardize the Supreme Court’s holdings on civil rights legis-
lation.122 Courts have additionally justified federal regulation of traditional state 
crimes on the grounds that Congress is not regulating robbery, but is instead reg-
ulating the ensuing “depletion of assets” as an economic issue.123 
D. Dissenting Views of the Hobbs Act’s Interstate Commerce Element 
Although every circuit court has upheld the use of the de minimis standard 
in local Hobbs Act prosecutions, dissenting and concurring opinions highlight 
some judicial disagreement to such rulings.124 Notably, a dissenting opinion to a 
Fifth Circuit en banc decision in United States v. Hickman argued that the prose-
cution could not satisfy the substantial effect test by aggregating separate, local 
                                                                                                                           
 118 236 F.3d at 852 (differentiating the law at issue in Morrison from the Hobbs Act on the basis 
that the Hobbs Act regulates criminal acts that have an economic effect). 
 119 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (requiring that a robbery affect interstate commerce “in any way or 
degree”). 
 120 See Peterson, 236 F.3d at 852 (maintaining the de minimis standard on the grounds that the 
aggregation principle still exists following Lopez and Morrison); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 
398–99 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding the de minimis standard in Hobbs Act prosecutions, and analyz-
ing Lopez without any mention of enumerated powers or preservation of state powers). 
 121 United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1997). The Firth Circuit in Robinson 
limited Lopez to “remind[ing] us that from time to time, the judiciary must intercede to assure that 
Congress does not . . . dramatically alter the balance of federalism.” Id. The opinion subsequently 
stated that it was “well aware” of the arguments regarding the federalization of crimes traditionally 
prosecuted by the states, but did not address the issue. Id. 
 122 Id. at 1214; see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1964) (ruling that, even if the 
restaurant’s racial discrimination in the present case did not have a substantial impact on commerce, 
discrimination at restaurants in the aggregate did have such an effect). The court clarified that the 
Lopez ruling did not support such a proposition, because the Court in Lopez explicitly stated that it did 
not want to alter “well-established Commerce Clause precedents.” Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1214 (quot-
ing United States v. Knutson, 113 F.3d 27, 29 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 567–69 (1995))). 
 123 See, e.g., Peterson, 236 F.3d at 852 (clarifying that Congress did not regulate the act of rob-
bery itself, but instead targeted the economic effect that robberies have on interstate commerce in the 
aggregate). The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Peterson noted that the Hobbs Act did 
not make all robberies a federal offense, but only those with an effect on interstate commerce. Id. 
 124 See Miller, supra note 103, at 1768 (stating that judicial support for upholding the de minimis 
standard in local robberies is “hardly unanimous”). 
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robberies.125 Like the majority in Lopez, the Hickman dissent worried that per-
mitting the aggregation of robberies under the Hobbs Act would allow Congress 
to regulate other traditional state crimes by using the aggregation rationale.126 
Fifth Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham’s Hickman dissent advocated for 
the adoption of a rule that would prohibit the aggregation of noneconomic activi-
ties.127 Judge Higginbotham examined why cases that found a substantial effect 
on interstate commerce through aggregation generally involved economic enter-
prises, such as the wheat market in Wickard, the restaurant in McClung, or the 
motel in Heart of Atlanta Motel.128 He reasoned that, unlike the activities in 
those cases, robbery and extortion under the Hobbs Act are not economic.129 Par-
ticularly troubling for Judge Higginbotham was the fact that the Hobbs Act did 
not target a specific, larger market.130 He explained that individual robberies, 
untethered from a specific market, would have to relate to one another in some 
way to make aggregation appropriate.131 From this interpretation, Judge Hig-
ginbotham could not rationalize how such robberies are sufficiently related to, or 
dependent on, one another to justify regulation under Congress’s Commerce 
Power.132 
Fifth Circuit Judge Harold DeMoss Jr. issued a separate Hickman dissent 
and has consistently criticized using a de minimis standard to extend the Hobbs 
                                                                                                                           
 125 179 F.3d 230, 231 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The Fifth Circuit 
in United States v. Hickman was an equally divided en banc panel. Id. at 231 (majority opinion). The 
court issued a two-sentence majority opinion that simply affirmed the convictions on the basis of the 
en banc panel being equally divided. Id. 
 126 Id. at 232 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that, in the aggregate, large 
reductions of almost any crime would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id. Notably, 
the Fifth Circuit issued the Hickman decision prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, which 
adopted a similar rationale. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (ruling that Con-
gress could not solely rely on the aggregation principle to regulate noneconomic, criminal conduct); 
see also Hickman, 179 F.3d at 231 (ruling one year prior to Morrison, which the Court decided in 2000). 
 127 179 F.3d. at 235 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 128 Id.; see Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257–58 (1964) (ruling that 
Congress could regulate motels because proprietors’ discrimination had a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce in the aggregate); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1964) (finding that 
discrimination in restaurants affected interstate commerce in the aggregate); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (finding that Congress could regulate the amount of wheat grown on a farm 
because the production and consumption of wheat on local farms has, in the aggregate, an effect on 
interstate commerce). 
 129 Hickman, 179 F.3d at 237 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the no-
tion that robberies or the effects of robberies are “economic.” Id. at 237–38. The dissenting opinion 
stated that there must be a line between economic and noneconomic activity because otherwise any 
activity that involves a transfer could be considered as “economic.” Id. at 237. 
 130 See id. at 236 (“Without identification of a market or specific property that Congress wishes to 
protect, it is difficult at best to assess whether Congress had a rational basis for reaching acts that are 
insubstantial when viewed alone.”). 
 131 Id. at 237. 
 132 Id. 
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Act to traditional state crimes.133 In his dissent in Hickman, as well as in other 
decisions, Judge DeMoss repeatedly asserted that the government in a Hobbs 
Act prosecution of a local robbery should have to prove that the individual rob-
bery substantially affected interstate commerce.134 He reasoned that Congress 
did not intend for the Hobbs Act to apply to intrastate robberies, insofar as it 
passed the Hobbs Act to address highway robberies committed by labor unions 
in the 1930s and 1940s.135 The government in a Hobbs Act prosecution, there-
fore, could not rely on the aggregate effect of local robberies on interstate com-
merce to obtain a conviction because Congress never intended to regulate that 
market.136 
Judge DeMoss further supported his views by applying the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Lopez to local robberies under the Hobbs Act.137 Contrary to 
the circuit court rulings upholding the de minimis standard, Judge DeMoss em-
phasized Lopez’s focus on enumerated powers and the role of state power in a 
federal system.138 With this focus on restricting federal power, he reasoned that 
courts must strictly adhere to the third Lopez category’s “substantial effect” 
standard, which results in the de minimis standard being unconstitutional.139 He 
                                                                                                                           
 133 See id. at 243 (DeMoss, J., specially dissenting) (arguing that an individual robbery or extor-
tion under the Hobbs Act must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce); United States v. 
Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 248 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (same); see also United 
States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 530 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part) (dissenting on the 
application of the Hobbs Act to a local robbery in which the government did not prove that the indi-
vidual act of robbery substantially affected interstate commerce). 
 134 Accord Miles, 122 F.3d at 248 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (stating that the Hobbs Act 
should apply only to robberies that substantially affect interstate commerce). Judge DeMoss took the 
position that the Hobbs Act should apply to robberies in only three instances: robberies involving a 
channel of interstate commerce, robberies involving a person or item in interstate commerce, and 
robberies involving individual robberies that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. at 251. 
 135 Hebert, 131 F.3d at 527 (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part). Judge DeMoss made the distinction 
that Congress intended to target the robbery of goods in the movement of interstate commerce, and 
not the robbery of goods that arrived at a retail stores. Id.; see Hickman, 179 F.3d at 244 (DeMoss, J., 
specially dissenting) (“[N]othing in the legislative history of the Hobbs Act indicates that Congress 
was concerned with local robberies of retail establishments.”). 
 136 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 244 (DeMoss, J., specially dissenting) (stating that there exists “no 
rational basis” for the notion that Congress intended to address local robberies in the aggregate). 
 137 See id. at 243 (stating that Lopez is the “constitutional touchstone” that should control the 
outcome of Hobbs Act cases). 
 138 See Miles, 122 F.3d at 241 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring) (beginning his analysis by 
speaking of Lopez’s emphasis on enumerated powers and a balance between the national and state 
governments). Judge DeMoss specifically noted that the Court in Lopez stated that the federal gov-
ernment does not have a “general police power” to regulate intrastate activities. Id. at 242 (citing 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995)). 
 139 Id. at 248. Judge DeMoss discussed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Corona, in 
which the court found that a federal arson statute required a showing of a substantial impact on inter-
state commerce in each individual case to obtain a conviction. Id.; see United States v. Corona, 108 
F.3d 565, 570 (5th Cir. 1997) (requiring that the government prove that an individual instance of arson 
substantially affects interstate commerce). The ruling in Corona required a showing of a substantial 
effect to ensure that not every act of arson could become a federal crime. 108 F.3d at 570. Judge De-
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further concluded that, as a practical matter, the de minimis standard makes any 
robbery of any retail establishment a federal offense.140 Such a result directly 
conflicts with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Commerce Clause in 
Lopez—that Congress does not have a general police power over intrastate activ-
ities.141 
Judge DeMoss’s Hickman dissent, as well as his concurring and dissent-
ing opinions in other Hobbs Act cases, also examined the practical implica-
tions of permitting federal criminal law to apply to traditionally local 
crimes.142 Judge DeMoss described how prosecutors opportunistically charge 
local crimes under federal statutes, rather than under state statutes, to access 
federal mandatory sentencing requirements.143 For instance, in United States v. 
Herbert, a 1997 Fifth Circuit case, the defendant received a sentence “amount-
ing to life” for an armed robbery conviction, despite it being his first convic-
tion and having stolen less than one thousand dollars.144 In a broader critique, 
Judge Higginbotham’s dissenting opinion in Hickman noted that the Founders 
designed the federal courts with limited jurisdiction to ensure that they could 
                                                                                                                           
Moss, therefore, concluded that courts must apply Lopez to the Hobbs Act in the same way that the 
Fifth Circuit applied Lopez to the arson statute in Corona. Miles, 122 F.3d at 248 (DeMoss, J., special-
ly concurring). 
 140 Miles, 122 F.3d at 250 (DeMoss, J., specially concurring). 
 141 Id. Judge DeMoss reasoned that giving Congress the power to regulate intrastate robberies 
through the Commerce Clause would grant Congress a “general police power” and contradict “our 
dual system of government.” Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557). 
 142 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 242–43 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (examining the concerns 
around expanding the reach of federal criminal jurisdiction); United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 
526–27 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part) (explaining how federal prosecutors can turn 
state robberies into federal offenses to impose harsher sentences). 
 143 Hebert, 131 F.3d at 526–27 (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part). Judge DeMoss explained how 
prosecutors charge armed robberies as federal crimes under the Hobbs Act in order to access the “dra-
conian” sentencing requirements imposed under the companion firearm counts. Id. The federal statute, 
18 U.S.C. § 924(c), creates minimum sentencing guidelines for “crimes of violence” that involve the 
use of a firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). For instance, the statute requires a minimum sentence of 
seven years for “branching” a firearm during a violent crime. Id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). It also mandates a 
minimum sentence of twenty-five years if the defendant had been previously convicted under the 
statute. Id. § 924(c)(1)(C)(i). Judge DeMoss included a list of cases where defendants convicted of 
armed robbery under the Hobbs Act received what amounted to lifetime sentences because of the 
heightened sentencing requirements imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Hebert, 131 F.3d at 526 n.2 
(DeMoss, J., dissenting in part). 
 144 131 F.3d at 526–27 (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part). The defendant received approximately 
142 years in federal prison based on Hobbs Act convictions and under companion counts for using a 
firearm. Id. at 525 & n.1 (stating that the defendant received a sentence of 215 years, in which two-
thirds of that time stemmed from his convictions under the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and the 
remaining time came from his convictions under the relevant bank robbery statutes and their compan-
ion gun counts). Without the use of a firearm, the defendant would have received approximately ten 
years under the Hobbs Act. See id. at 520 (majority opinion) (stating that the defendant received 121 
months for the Hobbs Act convictions). Judge DeMoss took particular issue with the fact that nobody 
had been injured, no shots had been fired, and that it was the defendant’s first conviction. Id. at 526–
27 (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part). 
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operate effectively within a federalist system of government.145 Judge Hig-
ginbotham contended, therefore, that federal courts could not properly focus 
on the cases traditionally falling under their jurisdiction if they must oversee 
the criminal cases that are generally tried in state courts.146 Although the opin-
ions by Judges Higginbotham and DeMoss are not controlling on the de mini-
mis standard issue, they express many of the policy concerns that follow from 
a holding that internet use during a robbery automatically extends the reach of 
the Hobbs Act to traditionally state level robberies.147 
E. The Supreme Court’s Latest Hobbs Act Ruling: Taylor v. United States 
In 2016, in Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court applied the Hobbs 
Act to home invasions of marijuana dealers, evaluating contextual factors that 
had not been addressed in circuit court Hobbs Act cases involving local business 
robberies.148 Although a home invasion would generally not satisfy the Hobbs 
Act’s commerce element, the Court in Taylor ruled that the Hobbs Act applied to 
the home invasion because the defendant attempted to steal marijuana, a federal-
ly-regulated drug.149 The government, therefore, did not need to prove any other 
effect on interstate commerce.150 
The Court reasoned that, because Raich established that Congress could 
regulate the marijuana market under its Commerce Clause power, Congress 
could also regulate the robberies of marijuana through the Hobbs Act.151 The 
Court focused on whether what was being stolen was a part of an interstate mar-
                                                                                                                           
 145 Hickman, 179 F.3d at 242–43 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
 146 Id. Judge Higginbotham’s dissenting opinion noted that state courts have historically dealt 
with the “overwhelming percentage” of criminal litigation. Id. at 243. Consequently, if federal courts 
had to try the traditional state crimes of robbery, murder, and extortion, then they would be unable to 
“play their vital historical role.” Id. 
 147 See id. (analyzing how the expansion of criminal cases in the federal courts will harm the 
federal courts’ ability to deal with their traditional cases); Hebert, 131 F.3d at 526–27 (DeMoss, J., 
dissenting in part) (indicating the issue of allowing prosecutors to charge traditional states crimes as 
federal crimes in order to receive heightened sentencing requirements). 
 148 Compare Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2078 (2016) (detailing the defendant’s 
participation in several home invasions), with United States v. Baylor, 517 F.3d 899, 900 (6th Cir. 
2008) (involving a defendant convicted of robbing a pizza chain restaurant), and Hebert, 131 F.3d at 
520 (involving a defendant convicted of robbing a bank), and United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 
236 (5th Cir. 1997) (discussing a defendant that robbed a McDonald’s), and United States v. Robin-
son, 119 F.3d 1205, 1208–09 (5th Cir. 1997) (addressing a case where a defendant was convicted for 
robbing liquor stores and other retail establishments). 
 149 136 S. Ct. at 2077–78. 
 150 See id. at 2081 (ruling that the government does not need to prove an effect on interstate 
commerce in a Hobbs Act prosecution when the defendant targets a drug dealer). 
 151 Id. at 2080; see Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17, 22 (2005) (ruling that marijuana is in a 
“class of activities” that Congress can regulate). The Court supported its reasoning by explaining that 
someone who robs marijuana is affecting an interstate market that Congress has authority to regulate. 
Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2080. 
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ket that Congress could regulate, not on whether the robbery itself affected inter-
state commerce.152 Notably, the Court explicitly stated that it was not expanding 
the power of the Commerce Clause.153 Even though the Court attempted to limit 
its holding to robberies of drug dealers, it remains unclear whether such reason-
ing could apply to other markets that Congress has power to regulate.154 
F. The Use of the Internet in Hobbs Act Prosecutions 
The use of the internet during a robbery presents the latest challenge for 
courts in interpreting how far the Hobbs Act extends under the power of the 
Commerce Clause.155 As a system of connected computers and servers, the in-
ternet provides an unparalleled means of communication.156 Unlike other forms 
of communication, the internet offers countless methods to communicate in real 
time, including email, text messaging, picture messaging, social media, and auc-
tion websites.157 The internet is distinguishable from newspapers, television, or 
magazines, because it requires active use on behalf of the user.158 Along with 
requiring active participation, the internet is unique in that discernable borders or 
consistent travel paths do not constrain it.159 Lastly, the internet’s rapid world-
                                                                                                                           
 152 Michael Munoz, Comment, Taylor v. United States: In Federal Criminal Law, “Commerce 
Becomes Everything,” 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 478 (2017) (describing how the Supreme 
Court’s 2016 decision in Taylor v. United States did not analyze the crime committed, but instead 
ruled that “the regulation of marijuana is the ultimate factor”); see Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2080 (reason-
ing that if Congress can regulate the intrastate market for drugs under the Commerce Clause, then it 
can also regulate the theft of those drugs). 
 153 Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2081–82 (reassuring that Taylor’s ruling does not increase the Commerce 
Clause power established in Raich, and emphasizing that the holding only applies to robberies that 
intentionally target drug dealers). The Court explicitly stated that it was not rendering the Hobbs Act’s 
commerce element “superfluous.” Id. 
 154 See Munoz, supra note 152, at 480 (explaining why the Court’s broad view of the Commerce 
Clause under the Hobbs Act could have significant “future consequences”); see also United States v. 
Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 2020) (ruling that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Taylor applies 
to robberies involving commercial websites because Congress has the authority to regulate online 
transactions). 
 155 See United States v. Person, 714 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (addressing whether the 
use of Craigslist could satisfy the Hobbs Act’s interstate commerce element); United States v. Horne, 
474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) (deciding whether the use of eBay for committing a robbery 
satisfies the Hobbs Act’s interstate commerce element). 
 156 See H. Joseph Hameline & William Miles, The Dormant Commerce Clause Meets the Inter-
net, 41 BOS. BAR J. 8, 8 (1997) (stating that the internet “operates like no other existing method of 
communication”); see also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (describing the internet as “an 
international network of interconnected computers”). 
 157 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 851 (describing the various means of communication over the internet); 
Hameline & Miles, supra note 156, at 8 (stating how the internet is different from other means of 
communication). 
 158 Hameline & Miles, supra note 156, at 8. 
 159 See id. (explaining that the internet has no borders and that internet transactions never travel 
the same path). One scholar uses the example of two purchases made by a resident of Los Angeles 
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wide growth and ever-evolving applications make it even more difficult to defin-
itively categorize.160 These complexities present courts with unique circum-
stances in each case and with facts that do not always fit within the traditional 
interstate commerce case law.161 
Although there have been federal cases involving the use of the internet in 
Hobbs Act prosecutions, no circuit court has directly ruled on whether any use of 
the internet, standing alone, satisfies the interstate commerce element of the 
Hobbs Act.162 A 2007 opinion authored by Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Pos-
ner, United States v. Horne, found that the government satisfied the interstate 
element of the Hobbs Act because the defendant used eBay.163 The defendant in 
Horne used false advertisements to sell cars on eBay, and would rob buyers at 
gunpoint when they came to pick up their purchase.164 Judge Posner specified 
that the “buy” and “sell” offers made through eBay’s website constituted inter-
state commerce because these offers could be made by buyers worldwide.165 In 
2017, upon almost identical facts to those in Horne, the Sixth Circuit in Person 
similarly found that the use of the website Craigslist satisfied the Hobbs Act’s 
                                                                                                                           
from a Boston company’s website: the first purchase traveled through eight states and five computers, 
but the second purchase went through six states and nine computers. Id. 
 160 See Michelle Evans, 5 Stats You Need to Know About the Digital Consumer in 2019, FORBES 
(Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michelleevans1/2018/12/17/5-stats-you-need-to-know-
about-the-digital-consumer-in-2019/#6c85c0d636bd [https://perma.cc/EY4y-SDCZ] (stating that 
around four billion people will use the internet in 2019, which is over half of the world’s population); 
see also Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (stating that forty million people used the internet in 1996). 
 161 See Hameline & Miles, supra note 156, at 8 (“Courts have encountered great difficulty in 
placing the Internet into an existing legal context—is it like television, print media, telephone or a 
highway?”). 
 162 See United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the use of 
Craigslist advertisements in furtherance of a robbery satisfied the interstate commerce element of the 
Hobbs Act); United States v. Person, 714 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (same); United States v. 
Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) (ruling that the use of eBay to facilitate a robbery satisfied 
the Hobbs Act’s commerce element). Notably, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Luong explicitly stated that its holding did not address all uses of the internet in connection with 
a robbery, but rather ruled solely on transactions “facilitated by electronic marketplaces.” 965 F.3d at 
983–84 (stating that “[w]e do not need to reach this question [as to whether all internet use affects com-
merce], however, because the evidence was sufficient to show that Luong clearly affected interstate 
commerce by robbing his victim as part of a commercial transaction facilitated by a website”). 
 163 474 F.3d at 1006. eBay is an auction website that allows users to make “buy” and “sell” offers 
for products advertised on the website. Id. The defendant in the Seventh Circuit’s 2007 United States 
v. Horne case used eBay to advertise vintage automobiles. Id. at 1005. The defendant would commit a 
robbery when the victims arrived to pick up the car that they bought from the defendant through eBay. Id. 
 164 Id. at 1005. The defendant’s only robbery with a “successful” result involved his stealing a 
GPS system from a victim’s vehicle. Id. The court sentenced the defendant to approximately sixteen 
years in prison. Id. at 1005–06. 
 165 Id. at 1006. Judge Posner, in calling eBay an “avenue of interstate commerce,” compared eBay 
to a highway. Id. He further clarified that, because the use of eBay constituted interstate commerce, 
the government did not need to prove that any victims came from outside of the state, or that any 
money was transferred between states. Id. Rather, it was sufficient that the defendant disrupted “inter-
state transactions” by making fraudulent offers on eBay. Id. 
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commerce element because Craigslist is a marketplace on the Internet, which is a 
channel of commerce that Congress can regulate.166 Neither opinion, however, 
addressed whether the use of the internet in every instance would satisfy the 
Hobbs Act’s commerce element.167 
Unlike in Horne and Person, the Ninth Circuit in 2020, in United States v. 
Luong, ruled that the defendant affected interstate commerce by posting an ad-
vertisement to Craigslist, despite the fact that the internet forum in question fo-
cused solely on transactions in the defendant’s local area.168 With a similar 
scheme to those of the defendants in the previous cases, the defendant in Luong 
advertised a car online and then robbed the buyer at gunpoint when they met to 
complete the transaction.169 In an opinion authored by Judge William E. Smith, 
the Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Taylor, and found 
that the Hobbs Act applies to intrastate online transactions because Congress 
possesses the power to regulate such transactions in the aggregate.170 Notably, 
the opinion indicated that the court was not determining whether internet use 
always establishes federal jurisdiction, and instead specifically limited its ruling 
                                                                                                                           
 166 714 F. App’x at 548, 551. Compare id. at 548 (describing how the defendant used Craigslist to 
advertise cars to buyers, whom he would rob after they arrived to pick up the car), with Horne, 474 
F.3d at 1005 (detailing how the defendant would market fake cars on eBay to lure purchasers into 
being robbed). Craigslist provides users with the opportunity to advertise goods to other users through 
the use of its website. Person, 714 F. App’x at 549. The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Chambers 
ruled that the internet is a channel of interstate commerce. 441 F.3d 438, 450 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding 
that the defendant used “channels of interstate commerce” when seeking sexual images over the inter-
net). Although the court in Chambers did not explicitly state that the internet was a channel of inter-
state commerce, it ruled that the defendant used a channel of commerce when sending pictures on the 
internet. Id.; see Person, 714 F. App’x at 551 (citing Chambers in support of the contention that the 
internet is a channel of commerce). 
 167 See Person, 714 F. App’x at 551 (“The government proved the commerce element in this case 
by showing that Person’s crimes involved the internet, which is a channel of interstate commerce.”); 
Horne, 474 F.3d at 1005–06 (ruling in a manner that did not specify whether the court’s holding was 
limited to the facts of the case). The facts of Person demonstrated that the defendant relied mainly on 
the internet to induce his victims. 714 F. App’x at 548. It is not clear whether a lesser use of the inter-
net in the furtherance of a robbery would still satisfy the standard. See id. at 551. 
 168 See United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 979, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the de-
fendant’s use of a local forum on Craigslist to commit a robbery satisfied the Hobbs Act’s commerce 
element). The Craigslist forum described itself as a “local service” because it only provided transac-
tion opportunities within the San Francisco Bay Area. Id. at 979. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 982–83; see Taylor v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2016) (holding that the 
Hobbs Act applied to local robberies of marijuana because Congress possessed the power to regulate 
the interstate market for illegal drugs). Although the Ninth Circuit recognized that the ruling in Taylor 
was limited to drug robberies, the court applied the Taylor rationale to a Hobbs Act robbery case in-
volving commercial websites. Luong, 965 F.3d at 982–83. The court reasoned that, because Congress 
has the power to regulate online transactions, it can also regulate robberies that utilize those transac-
tions. Id. The court ultimately concluded that the Hobbs Act always applies to robberies in which the 
defendant “used a commercial website to advertise a commercial transaction in order to facilitate a 
robbery.” Id. at 983. 
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to robberies that utilize commercial websites.171 The following Part addresses 
the question that the circuit courts in Horne, Person, and Luong did not explicit-
ly answer—should courts apply a categorical rule or a case-by-case analysis to 
determine whether internet use establishes Hobbs Act jurisdiction?172 
II. CATEGORICAL RULE OR FUNCTIONAL TEST FOR INTERNET  
USE ESTABLISHING HOBBS ACT JURISDICTION 
Courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly under the Hobbs 
Act, particularly when businesses are the victims of the robberies.173 The case 
law, however, does not thoroughly address the impact of internet use on estab-
lishing federal criminal jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act’s commerce ele-
ment.174 With the ubiquity of the internet in modern society, the solution to this 
issue will determine whether many small-scale robberies targeting individuals 
could become federal crimes.175 This potential expansion of federal jurisdiction 
could significantly impact defendant sentencing, state autonomy in criminal 
                                                                                                                           
 171 Luong, 965 F.3d at 983–84 (stating that its ruling “does not mean every local robbery is a 
Hobbs Act robbery simply because the robber touched his smart phone to check the weather or plan a 
get-away route”). Although the court limited its ruling to robberies involving commercial websites, it 
is not clear how far its reasoning could be extended to include other internet uses that facilitate a rob-
bery. See id. 
 172 See id. at 983–84 (declining to rule on whether internet use always establishes Hobbs Act 
jurisdiction); Person, 714 F. App’x at 551 (ruling that the use of Craigslist satisfied the Hobbs Act’s 
commerce element); Horne, 474 F.3d at 1006 (finding that the use of eBay affected interstate com-
merce, without ruling on whether other uses of the internet affect commerce). 
 173 See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1212–13 (5th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the 
commerce element of the Hobbs Act is satisfied by showing a “slight effect” on interstate commerce, 
as well as that robberies of businesses generally have an effect on interstate commerce in the aggre-
gate). Like other circuit courts, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Rob-
inson found that a robbery that “depletes the assets” of a business satisfies the commerce element 
because it harms the business’s ability to buy products from other states. Id. at 1212. 
 174 See United States v. Person, 714 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (ruling that the use of 
Craigslist to commit a robbery constituted a disruption of interstate commerce because the internet is a 
channel and an instrumentality of interstate commerce); United States v. Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 
(7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the use of eBay satisfied the commerce element of the Hobbs Act because 
the defendant’s offers to sell cars created “interstate transactions”). Neither the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Person, nor the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
in United States v. Horne explicitly ruled on whether the use of the internet in any circumstance in-
volving a robbery would suffice to satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce requirement. See Person, 714 F. 
App’x at 551; Horne, 474 F.3d at 1006. 
 175 See United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 239 (6th Cir. 2000) (ruling that, unlike with rob-
beries of businesses, robberies of individuals generally cannot satisfy the commerce element of the 
Hobbs Act through the aggregation principle, and that instead the government needs to prove an effect 
on interstate commerce in each case). The Sixth Circuit in 2000 in United States v. Wang surmised 
that the “overwhelming majority” of Hobbs Act cases would address the robberies of companies and 
businesses involved in interstate commerce, rather than the robberies of individuals. Id. at 240. 
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justice matters, and the jurisdictional balance between state and federal 
courts.176 
This Part details the arguments for and against courts adopting a categori-
cal rule that internet use satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce element.177 Sec-
tion A introduces two legal theories justifying a categorical rule, one of which 
relies on the internet being an instrumentality of commerce, and another that is 
based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Taylor v. United States.178 Section B 
describes how a categorical rule promotes judicial efficiency and bolsters Con-
gress’s ability to regulate national issues.179 Section C considers an alternative 
functional rule that requires courts to determine the nature of internet use in 
each case.180 Section D examines how a functional rule supports state autono-
my and preserves the traditional role of federal courts.181 
A. Legal Theories Justifying a Categorical Rule 
1. Internet Use Always Satisfies the Hobbs Act’s Commerce Element as a 
Channel and Instrumentality of Interstate Commerce 
Because the internet is a platform for economic transactions, the instru-
mentality theory relies on the interstate commerce framework introduced by 
the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez.182 The Lopez framework recog-
nizes certain “categories of activity” that Congress can govern under the 
Commerce Clause.183 Specifically, Congress can always regulate activities in-
volving channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, even if the reg-
                                                                                                                           
 176 See United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2001) (discussing how charging 
the defendant under the Hobbs Act, instead of state law, resulted in a much harsher sentence due to the 
mandatory minimum sentence requirement at the federal level), aff’d by an equally divided court, 311 
F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). See generally Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 655 (exam-
ining the effects and consequences of expanded federal jurisdiction in criminal and civil law). 
 177 See infra notes 173–239 and accompanying text. 
 178 See infra notes 182–205 and accompanying text. 
 179 See infra notes 206–213 and accompanying text. 
 180 See infra notes 214–231 and accompanying text. 
 181 See infra notes 232–239 and accompanying text. 
 182 See 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (describing the three categories as: (1) “channels of inter-
state commerce,” (2) “instrumentalities of interstate commerce,” and (3) “activities having a substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce”); see also United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 
2006) (ruling that the internet is a channel and instrumentality of interstate commerce); United States 
v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (same). Channels of interstate commerce often 
involve the structures that facilitate the movement or transportation of goods, such as roads, highways, 
and waterways. Nathaniel H. Clark, Comment, Tangled in a Web: The Difficulty of Regulating Intra-
state Internet Transmissions Under the Interstate Commerce Clause, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 947, 954 
(2009). Instrumentalities of interstate commerce generally include means of transporting goods, such 
as automobiles, boats, and airplanes. Id. at 958. 
 183 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (listing the three “categories of activity” that Congress can regulate 
through its Commerce Clause power). 
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ulated activity occurs entirely intrastate.184 Any use of the internet during a 
robbery, therefore, satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce element because the 
internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce that Congress can regu-
late.185 
The instrumentality theory arises from courts’ reasoning in child pornog-
raphy cases involving the internet.186 In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit in United States v. MacEwan ruled that downloading an illicit 
image from the internet automatically satisfied the statute’s commerce element 
because the internet is both a channel and an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce.187 The court reasoned that any use of the internet establishes feder-
al jurisdiction, insofar as the internet “is inexorably intertwined with interstate 
commerce.”188 Notably, in 2017, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit in United States v. Person seemingly adopted this instrumentality ra-
tionale, and found that the defendant’s use of Craigslist to commit a robbery 
satisfied the Hobbs Act’s commerce element.189 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Id. An example of an intrastate activity that Congress can regulate under the first two United 
States v. Lopez categories is when a person purchases a television from a retailer store. Jonathan R. 
Gray, Comment, United States v. Schaefer and United States v. Sturm: Why the Federal Government 
Should Regulate All Internet Use as Interstate Commerce, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 691, 701–02 (2012). 
Although this purchase occurred entirely intrastate, a truck (an instrumentality) driving on a highway 
(a channel) likely transported the television. Id. 
 185 See United States v. Person, 714 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (ruling that the govern-
ment satisfied the Hobbs Act’s commerce element by demonstrating that the defendant’s crime used 
the internet, which is an instrumentality of interstate commerce); Brief for the United States as Appel-
lee at 19, United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 2020) (No. 16-10213), 2017 WL 238932, at 
*19 (arguing that the defendant’s use of the internet satisfied the Hobbs Act commerce element be-
cause he “availed himself” of an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce); see also Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 558 (stating that Congress can regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce, regard-
less of whether the activity occurs entirely intrastate). 
 186 See MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245 (finding irrelevant whether the use of the internet in the partic-
ular case caused any transmissions across state lines, and instead deciding that the use of the internet 
automatically satisfied the statute’s commerce element); Hornaday, 392 F.3d at 1311 (ruling that 
Congress has the power to regulate illicit communications with minors over the internet because it is a 
channel and an instrumentality of commerce). 
 187 445 F.3d at 245. The court explained that the statute in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit’s 2006 case United States v. MacEwan prohibited people from knowingly receiving child 
pornography “that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any 
means, including by computer.” Id. at 243 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2006)). 
 188 Id. at 245. 
 189 See 714 F. App’x at 551 (stating that the prosecution satisfied the commerce element because 
“Person’s crimes involved the Internet, which is a channel of interstate commerce”). In stating that the 
internet satisfied the commerce element because it is a channel of interstate commerce, the court in 
Person cited a Sixth Circuit child pornography case. Id.; see United States v. Chambers, 441 F.3d 438, 
450 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding a child pornography conviction because the defendant used the inter-
net, as a channel of commerce, to receive illicit images). 
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Nevertheless, the commerce language of the Hobbs Act differs from that 
of the child pornography statute.190 Unlike the Hobbs Act requirement that 
there be an actual effect on interstate commerce, the statute at issue in MacE-
wan prohibited the knowing reception of child pornography that was “trans-
ported” in interstate commerce.191 The child pornography statute prohibited 
certain conduct in a channel of commerce, rather than requiring that conduct to 
affect interstate commerce.192 Accordingly, the courts in the child pornography 
cases focused on how Congress could regulate activities involving the instru-
mentalities of commerce, without determining whether the use of the internet 
itself affected commerce.193 
2. Internet Use Categorically Satisfies the Commerce Element Because It Is 
a Market That Congress Possesses the Power to Regulate 
Unlike the instrumentality theory that focuses on Congress’s power to 
regulate instrumentalities of commerce, the Taylor theory proposes a categori-
cal rule based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor in 2016.194 In Taylor, 
the Court ruled that robberies or attempted robberies of marijuana always satis-
fy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element because Congress has the power to reg-
ulate the national and local marijuana markets.195 The Court stated that Con-
                                                                                                                           
 190 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018) (prohibiting robberies and extortions that “in any way or 
degree” affect interstate commerce), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2006) (criminalizing the 
knowing reception of child pornography that has traveled in interstate commerce “by any means, 
including by computer”). Notably, the child pornography statute’s language explicitly includes com-
puters when describing its commerce element. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 191 MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 239 n.1 (stating that the statute prohibits child pornography “that has 
been mailed, or shipped or transported” in interstate commerce (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) 
(2006)). 
 192 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2018) (applying to an act of robbery or extortion that “obstructs, 
delays, or affects commerce”), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2006) (addressing child pornogra-
phy received through a computer). Since the ruling in MacEwan, Congress added language to the 
statute, in which the use of child pornography can qualify under the statute when it affects interstate 
commerce. Compare MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 239 n.1 (stating the language of the statute as “child 
pornography that has been mailed, or shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce by any 
means” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2006))), with 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2018) (re-
quiring that child pornography “has been mailed, or has been shipped or transported in or affecting 
interstate or foreign commerce by any means” (emphasis added)). 
 193 See, e.g., MacEwan, 445 F.3d at 245 (ruling that downloading illicit images from the internet 
always satisfies the statute’s commerce element because the internet is an instrumentality of interstate 
commerce). 
 194 See 136 S. Ct. 2074, 2081 (2016) (holding that the government can satisfy the Hobbs Act’s 
commerce element by proving that the defendant knowingly robbed or attempted to rob drugs or earn-
ings from the sale of illegal drugs). The defendant in the 2016 Supreme Court case Taylor v. United 
States committed two home invasions of drug dealers’ residences, but stole only $40, a couple of cell 
phones, some jewelry, and one marijuana cigarette. Id. at 2078. 
 195 Id. at 2081; see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17, 22 (2005) (ruling that Congress can regu-
late intrastate activities, such as drug possession and dealing, upon a determination that local instances 
of a practice pose a threat to the national market). The 2005 Supreme Court opinion Gonzales v. Raich 
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gress could regulate the intrastate marijuana market because the possession 
and sale of controlled substances composed a “class of activities” that substan-
tially affects commerce in the aggregate.196 The Court reasoned that because 
Congress has authority over the intrastate marijuana market, it also must have 
the power to regulate intrastate marijuana robberies.197 
The Taylor theory contends that the rationale that all drug robberies satis-
fy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element should also apply to extend the Hobbs 
Act to cases that involve the internet.198 Like with the marijuana market, Con-
gress unquestionably possesses the power to regulate the internet under the 
Commerce Clause.199 Because Congress can govern the internet, the theory 
goes, Congress can also criminalize robberies that involve any use of the inter-
net.200 The fact that the use of the internet, like the use of marijuana, is a “class 
of activity” with an enormous effect on interstate commerce in the aggregate 
further supports the Taylor theory.201 
                                                                                                                           
involved California residents that were charged federally for growing and smoking their own marijua-
na, which they did entirely intrastate. 545 U.S. at 7. The two California residents challenged whether 
Congress possessed power under the Commerce Clause to prosecute them for marijuana that was 
grown and ingested entirely within the state of California. Id. at 9. 
 196 Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2080; see Raich, 545 U.S. at 17–18 (stating that Congress can regulate 
local activities that do not have a substantial impact on interstate commerce when the inability to 
regulate those intrastate activities would “undercut the regulation of the interstate market”); see also 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128–29 (1942) (ruling that Congress can regulate conduct that 
appears menial and intrastate when that conduct, taken in the aggregate across the country, has a sub-
stantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 197 Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2080. In making this determination, the Taylor Court insisted that the 
ruling did not expand the Commerce Clause power of Congress, but rather “graft[ed]” the ruling in 
Raich into the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. Id. 
 198 See Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 22:00 (introducing the argument that Taylor’s holding on 
marijuana robberies can apply to internet use because Congress possesses the ability to regulate the 
internet); see also Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2080 (ruling that, because Congress can regulate the intrastate 
possession and selling of narcotics, it can also regulate intrastate robberies involving those narcotics). 
During the oral argument for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s 2020 decision United 
States v. Luong, Judge William E. Smith raised the potential theory that the reasoning of Taylor can 
apply to internet use, which the prosecutor supported. Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 22:00. 
 199 See United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that Congress “clear-
ly” possesses the authority to regulate the internet because it is an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce); United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); United States v. Hor-
naday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (same); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 
558 (1995) (stating that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to regulate “instrumentali-
ties of interstate commerce”). 
 200 See, e.g., Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d at 953 (stating that Congress can regulate the internet under the 
Commerce Clause). This is the same rationale that the Supreme Court applied in Taylor when it ruled 
that, because Congress could regulate the intrastate drug market, it could also regulate robberies of 
narcotics that occur entirely intrastate. See Taylor, 136 S. Ct. at 2080 (finding it “a simple matter of 
logic” that if Congress can regulate the intrastate drug market, then it can also regulate robberies in-
volving those drugs). 
 201 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 17–18 (stating that Congress can regulate intrastate activities when 
those activities have a substantial impact on interstate commerce in the aggregate). As of 2015, the 
internet constituted 6% of the United States economy, and generated over $900 billion in revenue. 
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There are uncertainties surrounding this theory because the Court in Tay-
lor explicitly noted that the ruling applied only to robberies involving drug 
dealers.202 It is therefore unclear whether Taylor’s reasoning regarding the ma-
rijuana market could apply to the general use of the internet.203 The application 
of Taylor to the internet is further limited because, unlike the inherent crimi-
nality of marijuana possession and distribution under federal law, Congress 
does not prohibit or criminalize the use of the internet by itself.204 In a Hobbs 
Act case involving the internet, the government is instead criminalizing rob-
beries wherein the internet may have been used to facilitate or assist with 
committing the crime itself.205 
B. Supporting a Categorical Rule: The Policies of Efficiency and Necessity 
The argument in support of a categorical rule that internet use always es-
tablishes Hobbs Act jurisdiction offers policy justifications of judicial efficien-
cy and congressional necessity.206 As with any bright-line standard, a categori-
cal rule is efficient because it creates predictable outcomes as to jurisdictional 
questions, which in turn encourages plea negotiations.207 With expedited pro-
                                                                                                                           
Tom Risen, Study: The U.S. Internet Is Worth $966 Billion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., https://www.
usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/12/11/the-internet-is-6-percent-of-the-us-economy-study-
says [https//perma.cc/X6NK-UJMA] (Jan. 22, 2016). 
 202 See 136 S. Ct. at 2082 (“Our holding today is limited to cases in which the defendant targets 
drug dealers for the purpose of stealing drugs or drug proceeds.”). The opinion further stated that the 
ruling did not address robberies involving other individuals or companies. Id. 
 203 See id. at 2080 (reasoning that Congress can regulate local robberies of narcotics because it 
has full power to regulate the intrastate possession and consumption of drugs). The Court in Taylor 
did not foreclose the future application of this logic to other circumstances, but did limit the holding to 
the robberies of drug dealers. Id. at 2082. Notably, the Ninth Circuit in Luong applied the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Taylor to find that the Hobbs Act regulates local robberies that involve commer-
cial websites. 965 F.3d 973, 982–83 (9th Cir. 2020). The ruling, however, did not address all potential 
uses of the internet, but was instead limited to robberies wherein “a commercial website [was used] to 
advertise a commercial transaction in order to facilitate a robbery.” Id. at 983. 
 204 See Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 25:15 (raising the distinction that Congress criminalized 
the marijuana in Taylor, whereas Congress did not prohibit the use of Craigslist in the present case); 
see also 21 U.S.C. § 841 (criminalizing the improper possession or distribution of specified substanc-
es, including marijuana). 
 205 See United States v. Person, 714 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (finding that the defendant 
violated the Hobbs Act by advertising cars on Craigslist and then robbing the potential buyers when 
they came to view the car); United States v. Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) (convicting 
the defendant for robbery under the Hobbs Act because he used eBay, a website, to trap his victims 
who he robbed at gunpoint). 
 206 See United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1209 (5th Cir. 1997) (crediting Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power for America’s profound economic growth over the past centuries); Gray, 
supra note 184, at 710 (stating that a clear rule for Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause 
assists courts by making cases more predictable). 
 207 See Gray, supra note 184, at 710–11 (examining how a clear mandate from Congress under 
the Commerce Clause power makes prosecutions more straightforward); see also Andrew McLetchie, 
Note, The Case for Bright-Line Rules in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Adopting the Tenth Cir-
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ceedings, such a rule would permit federal courts to allocate more of their time 
and resources to the complex and significant cases that the Founders designed 
them to oversee.208 
The main policy rationale of a categorical rule is, however, that Congress 
needs the unfettered ability to regulate any crimes that involve the internet.209 
The internet is fundamentally an interstate and worldwide system, meaning 
that states alone cannot meaningfully regulate it.210 Congress, therefore, is left 
with the regulatory burden.211 Proponents of a categorical rule would contend 
that the Commerce Clause case law supports Congress’s ability to address na-
tional issues through its commerce power, which has historically justified the 
enactment of civil rights legislation, the criminalization of controlled substanc-
es, and the guarantee of a right to unionize.212 Ultimately, even if this rule im-
pedes state control over sentencing policies, its supporters would deem it nec-
essary to prioritize federal internet regulation over the preservation of certain 
state powers.213 
                                                                                                                           
cuit’s Bright-Line Test for Determining the Voluntariness of Consent, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 225, 228 
(2001) (explaining that the benefit of bright-line rules is their clear guidance for prosecutors and judges 
and their ability to minimize the number of appeals). Some argue that courts should rule that internet use 
always satisfies the statute at issue in MacEwan, which prohibited the transportation of illicit images of 
minors in interstate commerce. Gray, supra note 184, at 710; see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) (2006) 
(forbidding the knowing reception of child pornography in interstate commerce). 
 208 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 243 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that federal courts cannot properly focus on their traditional cases if they must 
act as “major criminal courts”); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 682 (describing federal 
courts as tasked with addressing issues of “national interest”). 
 209 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 670–72 (explaining the argument that Congress 
requires the power to address the needs of the public, especially with regard to crime). 
 210 See Gray, supra note 184, at 706 (describing the internet as “inherently interstate in nature,” 
which means that Congress can regulate it under the Commerce Clause); see also Stern, supra note 
48, at 1335 (stating that the Constitutional Convention ratified the Commerce Clause to give the fed-
eral government control over issues that the states could not appropriately address themselves). One 
scholar asserts that the Founders called the Constitutional Convention because they primarily wanted 
to give the federal government power over commerce, as the states could not handle the task individu-
ally. Stern, supra note 48, at 1337–38. 
 211 See Gray, supra note 184, at 706 (reasoning that Congress can regulate the internet to the 
“fullest extent of its Commerce Clause powers” because the internet is a channel and an instrumentali-
ty of commerce, and because it has a substantial effect on interstate commerce). 
 212 See Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (upholding Congress’s use of the Commerce 
Clause power to pass legislation that criminalized the possession and selling of controlled substances); 
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304–05 (1964) (ruling that Congress properly used its Com-
merce Clause power in enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to target racial discrimination in restau-
rants); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (finding that the Wagner Act’s 
guaranteeing of a right to unionize was within Congress’s commerce power). 
 213 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 667 (asserting that state concerns and policies 
cannot take priority over issues of national interest, particularly because the Founders created a na-
tional government under the Constitution to allow national concerns to supersede state interests). In 
short, the argument is federalism concerns cannot impede the federal government’s ability to address 
national issues. Id. 
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C. Functional Method: A Case-by-Case Inquiry as to Whether Use of the 
Internet Satisfies the Hobbs Act’s Commerce Element 
Unlike the categorical arguments, the functional theory requires a case-
by-case inquiry to determine whether internet use in a robbery affected inter-
state commerce.214 This inquiry distinguishes types of internet use in the same 
manner that courts differentiate between robberies of individuals and robberies 
of businesses.215 Robberies of businesses generally satisfy the Hobbs Act’s 
commerce element because they affect commerce in the aggregate, but rob-
beries of individuals satisfy the element when there is merely a “realistic pos-
sibility” of affecting commerce.216 In this model, commerce websites, such as 
eBay and Craigslist, would be viewed in the same manner as businesses, 
whereas all other types of internet use would be held to the same standard as 
robberies of individuals.217 
The functional theory treats commerce websites as if they are traditional 
retail establishments, wherein any robbery involving them satisfies the Hobbs 
Act’s commerce element.218 This theory places the use of retail websites within 
the third Lopez category of activities that Congress can regulate under the 
Commerce Clause because the activities involve conduct that has a “substan-
tial relation to interstate commerce.”219 In determining whether Hobbs Act 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1087 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that an examination 
of the case facts is necessary to determine whether interstate commerce was affected by the robbery of 
an individual). 
 215 Compare United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1213–14 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that 
robberies of businesses satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element because they impede companies 
from spending on items from other states), with United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 238 (6th Cir. 
2000) (identifying that robberies of individuals require a higher burden of proof for the commerce 
element because the connection to interstate commerce for individuals is generally “more attenuat-
ed”). 
 216 See Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1084 (explaining that robberies of businesses generally fall under the 
reach of the Hobbs Act); Wang, 222 F.3d at 238–39 (stating that the government in a Hobbs Act case 
possesses the burden of proving that robberies of individuals “ha[ve] a ‘realistic possibility’ of affect-
ing interstate commerce”). 
 217 See, e.g., Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212–13 (explaining that robberies of businesses generally 
satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element). “Commerce websites” describes websites that function as 
online stores or markets, and generally receive commission on items sold through the platform. See 
United States v. Person, 714 F. App’x 547, 549 (6th Cir. 2017) (describing Craigslist as a website that 
offers users the opportunity to advertise goods for sale on the internet); United States v. Horne, 474 
F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that eBay is an auction website that connects interstate and 
international users); Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 185, at 15 (describing 
Craigslist as an “online marketplace” that over sixty million Americans use each year, on which there 
are approximately eighty million posts each month). 
 218 See, e.g., Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212–13 (describing the depletion of assets theory that makes 
robberies of businesses substantially impact interstate commerce in the aggregate); see also Diaz, 248 
F.3d at 1084 (stating that the “Hobbs Act usually is applied to robberies of businesses”). 
 219 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (stating that Congress can regulate 
conduct that substantially affects interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause). Notably, com-
merce websites can also fall under the first two Lopez categories involving Congress’s ability to regu-
2021] The Internet and the Hobbs Act: What’s the Connection? 1487 
robberies have a substantial relation to interstate commerce, courts apply a de 
minimis standard that requires only a slight effect on interstate commerce.220 In 
applying this standard, courts generally rule that robberies of businesses satisfy 
the commerce element because business robberies, in the aggregate, affect 
commerce.221 This reasoning would also apply to any robberies involving 
commerce websites.222 
Although retail websites cannot be robbed in the same manner as a physi-
cal store, robberies can still be committed by using their services.223 For in-
stance, the defendant in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s 
2007 case United States v. Horne made fake offers on eBay to sell his car in 
order to attract interested buyers to a location where he would rob them at 
                                                                                                                           
late channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce. See id. at 558 (describing the first two 
Lopez categories of channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce). With the internet catego-
rized as a channel of interstate commerce, Congress can regulate the buying and selling of goods on 
retail websites because the internet is acting as a channel. See Gray, supra note 184, at 702 (explaining 
how purchasing or selling items online qualifies the internet as a channel of interstate commerce, 
insofar as it offers the means for obtaining interstate goods). The Seventh Circuit in Horne adopted 
this view when it ruled that eBay is an “avenue of commerce” and compared it to a highway. 474 F.3d 
at 1006. This reasoning, which essentially places retail websites under the third Lopez category, would 
categorically satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. Compare id. (finding that using eBay satis-
fied the commerce element because it is an instrumentality and a channel), with Robinson, 119 F.3d at 
1212–13 (placing robberies under the third Lopez category and finding that robberies of businesses 
always satisfy the Hobbs Act). 
 220 See United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 452, 456 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding the de minimis 
standard in Hobbs Act prosecutions); Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212 (same); United States v. Atcheson, 
94 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 399 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(same). 
 221 See Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1084 (stating that Hobbs Act robberies usually involve robberies of 
businesses, rather than individuals); Wang, 222 F.3d at 240 (predicting that most Hobbs Act prosecu-
tions will involve robberies of businesses, rather than robberies of individuals). Courts often reason 
that these robberies affect interstate commerce because businesses are involved in commerce, and 
when they are robbed, their ability to spend on interstate goods and services is weakened. See Robin-
son, 119 F.3d at 1212–13 (explaining that a robbery of a business satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce 
element because it harms the business’s ability to purchase items and services from outside of the 
state); Bolton, 68 F.3d at 399 (finding that the defendant’s robberies of several businesses affected 
interstate commerce because they “depleted the assets of businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce”). 
 222 See United States v. Luong, 965 F.3d 973, 983 (9th Cir. 2020) (finding that the Hobbs Act 
applied to robberies wherein the defendant “used a commercial website” to “facilitate” the crime); 
Horne, 474 F.3d at 1006 (finding that the robbery of a person lured by another through eBay obstruct-
ed interstate transactions conducted on the website). This theory relies on the notion that, like when a 
person robs a store of cash, when a person robs commerce websites of their commissions on products 
that would otherwise be sold, such a robbery limits the websites’ ability to purchase items in interstate 
commerce. See, e.g., Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212–13 (explaining the “depletion of assets” theory). 
 223 See United States v. Person, 714 F. App’x 547, 548 (6th Cir. 2017) (involving a defendant that 
used Craigslist advertisements to set up meetings to rob people); Horne, 474 F.3d at 1005–06 (uphold-
ing the conviction of a defendant who used eBay as a means to meet with buyers who he would am-
bush at gunpoint). 
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gunpoint.224 The Seventh Circuit found that the defendant’s conduct affected 
interstate commerce, insofar as his actions obstructed transactions on eBay.225 
Similar to the robberies of conventional stores, robberies through a retail web-
site affect interstate commerce in the aggregate because they deprive the web-
site of income and deter people throughout the country from using and paying 
for the website’s services.226 
Similar to the standard for robberies of individuals, the functional theory 
would require that any use of the internet not involving a retail website have a de 
minimis effect on interstate commerce.227 This standard would require courts to 
conduct a case-by-case inquiry to determine if the use of the internet affected 
interstate commerce.228 Courts would likely find that noncommercial internet 
use, such as Google Maps, does not satisfy this standard, because there is no ap-
parent effect on interstate commerce.229 The functional theory would, however, 
apply the Hobbs Act when defendants advertise items and services on social me-
dia websites and other messaging platforms, which do not take commissions on 
sales made between their users.230 For instance, if the defendant in Horne adver-
                                                                                                                           
 224 474 F.3d at 1005. 
 225 Id. at 1006. In hinting toward the aggregation theory, the court noted that most eBay transac-
tions are either international or interstate, meaning that defendant’s actions likely affected potential 
interstate transactions. Id. 
 226 See, e.g., Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1212 (stating that robberies of businesses inhibit the business-
es’ ability to purchase items or services, which affects interstate commerce in the aggregate). The 
Supreme Court in 1964 applied this same reasoning in Katzenbach v. McClung, in which it found that 
racial discrimination in restaurants had an aggregate effect on interstate commerce because it deterred 
African Americans from frequenting restaurants. See 379 U.S. 294, 300–01, 304–05 (1964) (uphold-
ing Congress’s finding that discrimination against African Americans in restaurants obstructed inter-
state commerce). 
 227 See, e.g., United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1084 (11th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the 
government needs to prove that the specific robbery of an individual had a “minimal impact” on inter-
state commerce). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2001 in United States v. Diaz 
explained three instances when robberies of individuals satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element: 
(1) the robbery lessens the assets of a person “directly” involved in interstate commerce, (2) the rob-
bery results in the victim “deplet[ing] the assets” of a business involved in interstate commerce, and 
(3) the number of people or money involved in the robbery is so “large” that it affects interstate com-
merce. Id. at 1084–85. 
 228 See id. at 1087 (stating that the court needed to examine the specific robberies and extortions 
of individuals to determine whether they affected interstate commerce); United States v. Wang, 222 
F.3d 234, 240 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing the defendant’s Hobbs Act conviction on the basis that the 
individual robbery committed by the defendant did not affect interstate commerce). 
 229 See Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1084–85 (stating that robberies of individuals satisfy the Hobbs Act only 
in circumstances that significantly involve either businesses or individuals involved in interstate mar-
kets); see also Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 18:00 (posing the hypothetical as to whether the use of 
Google Maps to escape from a robbery constitutes an effect on interstate commerce under the Hobbs 
Act). Notably, the Ninth Circuit in Luong clarified that its ruling would not apply the Hobbs Act to 
every local robbery wherein the perpetrator “touched his smart phone to . . . plan a get-away route.” 
965 F.3d 973, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2020). 
 230 Compare Noll v. eBay, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 462, 463 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (describing eBay as an 
online marketplace that charges users for advertising items on the website), with In re CTLI, LLC, 
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tised his car through a Facebook status post, his robbery would still affect inter-
state commerce insofar as he used the internet to rob the victim of the money 
that he would have otherwise spent on a car in interstate commerce.231 
D. Supporting a Case-by-Case Inquiry: The Policies of Federalism  
and Limited Federal Criminal Law 
The policy arguments in favor of a functional method are that it supports 
both state autonomy and the traditional role of federal courts.232 Unlike a cate-
gorical rule regarding internet use, a functional rule on this issue may deter 
prosecutors from forum shopping in federal court, especially in cases where it 
is not clear whether the use of the internet affected interstate commerce.233 By 
deterring prosecutors from forum shopping to receive heightened sentences, 
the functional method would promote state sentencing policies that local law-
makers crafted to address the interests and beliefs of their community.234 Pro-
ponents of such a rule would contend that this aligns with the Founders’ belief 
that the crafting of criminal law policies belongs to the states.235 
                                                                                                                           
528 B.R. 359, 365 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2015) (describing Facebook as allowing its 1.39 billion monthly 
users to post status updates that appear on the individual’s Facebook page without charge). 
 231 See United States v. Horne, 474 F.3d 1004, 1005 (7th Cir. 2007) (involving a defendant who 
posted an automobile on eBay to facilitate a robbery). This rationale is based on prior courts finding 
that the Hobbs Act applies when someone robs individuals “directly engaged in interstate commerce” 
of the assets that they would have otherwise used in interstate commerce. See Diaz, 248 F.3d at 1085 
(stating that the Hobbs Act can apply to individuals when “the crime depletes the assets of an individ-
ual who is directly engaged in interstate commerce”). 
 232 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 242–43 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Higginbotham, 
J., dissenting) (describing the jurisdictional boundaries between state and federal courts as “integral to 
our federalism”); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 664–65 (describing the negative consequences 
that could arise if federal courts expand their jurisdiction into the state realm). 
 233 See United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 526–27 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting in 
part) (criticizing the harsh sentences that defendants receive under the Hobbs Act for robberies that 
would normally be prosecuted at the state level). Specifically, armed robberies receive significantly 
harsher sentences at the federal level than at the state level because there are mandatory minimum 
sentences for violent crimes involving the use of weapons at the federal level. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(c) (requiring certain minimum sentences when a firearm is possessed or used in the commission 
of a violent crime). The Fifth Circuit’s 2001 case United States v. McFarland demonstrates the differ-
ence between state and federal sentencing laws for armed robbery; in that case, the defendant received 
approximately one hundred years in prison at the federal level, but could have been eligible for as 
little as five years at the state level. 264 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2001), aff’d by an equally divided 
court, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). 
 234 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 668 (reasoning that federal criminal laws with 
harsher sentences than their state law counterparts undermine the policy decisions made by the state 
legislatures). Some scholars observe that criminal penalties adopted by states often “reflect the states’ 
diverse values and priorities.” Id. at 666. 
 235 See id. at 659–60 (explaining that the Founders intended for states to oversee criminal laws 
and their enforcement). Scholars have argued that the Constitution, by listing only a few federal 
crimes, reflects the wish of the Founders to have state courts act as the main criminal courts. Id. 
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Along with promoting the policymaking role of states, the functional 
method would assist in preserving the limited role of federal courts.236 The 
Founders designed the federal courts to try a small volume of time-consuming 
cases that concern national issues.237 By not federalizing every robbery that 
involves internet use, the functional method would help ensure that federal 
courts do not become major criminal tribunals.238 Federal courts could conse-
quently utilize more of their resources to address the complex national cases 
that they are meant to oversee.239 
III. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A FUNCTIONAL TEST TO GOVERN WHETHER 
INTERNET USE SATISFIES THE HOBBS ACT’S COMMERCE ELEMENT 
Courts should adopt the functional theory’s case-by-case approach to de-
termine whether internet use in a robbery satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce 
element.240 The Commerce Clause case law, the Hobbs Act case law, and po-
tential federalism policy implications all support such a theory.241 Moreover, 
this method ensures that courts act as a check against Congress using the inter-
net as a vehicle to federalize other types of crimes.242 
                                                                                                                           
 236 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 242–43 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (stating that the Framers of 
the Constitution created federal courts with “limited jurisdiction” to ensure the federalist system of the 
United States government); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 677 (explaining that the role of 
federal courts is to attend to a small amount of cases that are of national importance). 
 237 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 663, 664–65, 677 (explaining why the Founders 
thought that federal courts were best suited to handle such significant cases). The Framers created 
federal courts to provide a highly competent forum to handle complex and important cases. Id. at 677, 
682. 
 238 See Hickman, 179 F.3d at 243 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (reasoning that courts cannot 
appropriately work if they must oversee the traditional state crimes of robbery, extortion, and assault). 
Judge Higginbotham’s dissenting opinion in the Fifth Circuit’s 1999 en banc case United States v. 
Hickman expressed fears that, without judicially imposed limitations, the Commerce Clause could run 
unchecked in its expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction. Id. 
 239 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 684 (describing why it is “inefficient and waste-
ful” for federal courts to try cases that the state courts could handle). In his scholarship, Judge William 
W. Schwarzer expresses concern that, in allocating their resources to cases involving state crimes, 
federal courts could not properly address more pressing federal issues. Id. 
 240 See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (stating that robberies and extortions fall under the act when they affect 
interstate commerce “in any way or degree”); see also United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1087 
(11th Cir. 2001) (conducting an inquiry into the specific facts of the case to determine whether the 
robbery of an individual affected interstate commerce). 
 241 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (indicating that states and the federal 
government must have a “healthy balance of power” between them); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra 
note 14, at 666 (expressing the need for states to maintain autonomy because they enact policies that 
are demonstrative of the local communities that they represent); see also United States v. Robinson, 
119 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1997) (ruling that the government can satisfy the Hobbs Act’s com-
merce element by demonstrating how robberies, in the aggregate, affect interstate commerce). 
 242 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 243 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Higginbotham, J., 
dissenting) (explaining that the expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction occurred because courts 
have not checked Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause). 
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The functional method supports the deterrence of forum shopping, the 
preservation of state autonomy, and the maintenance of limited jurisdiction for 
the federal courts.243 Without a categorical rule that internet use grants prose-
cutors’ federal jurisdiction in robberies, prosecutors will hesitate to automati-
cally charge such cases in federal court in pursuit of heightened sentences.244 
This promotes state autonomy by ensuring that state sentencing policies are not 
undercut by heightened federal sentencing guidelines.245 In fact, a categorical 
rule would undermine the residents of each state who voted for state attorneys 
general and judges based on their sentencing policies.246 This is not a theoreti-
cal concern—expanding the Hobbs Act would frustrate the criminal justice 
reform efforts of voters across the country who recently elected progressive 
state prosecutors for their commitments to addressing mass incarceration and 
overcriminalization.247 Additionally, ensuring that federal prosecutors cannot 
automatically bring charges for robberies based on internet use in federal court 
will prevent federal court caseloads from significantly increasing, thus ena-
bling the courts to concentrate on cases of national significance, as the Framers 
intended.248 
                                                                                                                           
 243 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 668, 677 (describing how criminal sentences with 
heightened mandatory minimums harm state autonomy by overshadowing state criminal sentencing 
laws, and also observing that the Framers intended federal courts to handle only a small number of 
cases). 
 244 See Gray, supra note 184, at 710–11 (explaining why clear legal guidance helps add “predict-
ability in the outcomes of cases,” as well as how it makes prosecutions more “effective”); see also 
United States v. McFarland, 264 F.3d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging that the defendant 
would have received a significantly lighter sentence had he been charged under state law rather than 
the Hobbs Act), aff’d by an equally divided court, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc); United 
States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 526–27 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part) (outlining that 
federal prosecutors charge armed robberies under the Hobbs Act to access heightened sentences not 
otherwise available under state law). 
 245 See Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 668 (identifying that federal prosecutors, by 
charging traditional state crimes under federal sentencing guidelines, effectively “nullify” state sen-
tencing laws). 
 246 See id. (stating that the practice of forum shopping by federal prosecutors is harmful to the 
nation’s federalist system because it significantly weakens state sentencing policies that local politi-
cians and judges enacted in accordance with the beliefs of their communities). 
 247 See Mark Berman, These Prosecutors Won Office Vowing to Fight the System. Now, the Sys-
tem Is Fighting Back., WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/these-
prosecutors-won-office-vowing-to-fight-the-system-now-the-system-is-fighting-back/2019/11/05/
20d863f6-afc1-11e9-a0c9-6d2d7818f3da_story.html [https://perma.cc/JG7R-NE5J] (stating that vot-
ers recently elected over two dozen progressive prosecutors across the country); see also Candace 
Smith, Jake Lefferman & Allie Yang, Progressive Prosecutors Aim to Change the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem from the Inside, ABC NEWS (Oct. 1, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/progressive-prosecutors-
aim-change-criminal-justice-system-inside/story?id=73371317 [https://perma.cc/BY2A-SXXE] (ex-
plaining that progressive prosecutors advocate for “ending mass incarceration” and promoting rehabil-
itative methods of punishment). 
 248 See United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230, 242–43 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Hig-
ginbotham, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Framers gave the federal courts “limited jurisdiction,” 
which is critical to the country’s system of federalism); Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 682 
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By maintaining that Congress cannot federalize every robbery involving 
internet use, the functional method embodies the Supreme Court’s insistence in 
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison that Congress not infringe 
upon traditional state powers.249 It also does not disrupt the Commerce Clause 
principles established in the New Deal Era, because it would still apply the 
aggregation principle to commerce websites to invoke Hobbs Act charges.250 
More importantly, by preserving the aggregation principle, the functional 
method does not threaten the Commerce Clause precedents that the Supreme 
Court relied on to uphold the Civil Rights Act of 1964.251 Along with abiding 
by Commerce Clause precedents, the functional method aligns with the Hobbs 
Act case law, insofar as it distinguishes between robberies on the basis of 
whether the robbery depleted the assets of a commercial enterprise.252 
To be sure, the functional theory is not without its flaws when compared 
with the categorical rules.253 The categorical rules are more efficient because 
                                                                                                                           
(describing how federal courts “provide a tribunal of undoubted integrity and competence for the 
adjudication of disputes imbued with a federal, that is, a national, interest”). Judge Schwarzer explains 
that the Constitution’s Framers wanted state courts to largely focus on crime, and that they made this 
clear by including only a few federal crimes in the Constitution. Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, 
at 659–60; see Hickman, 179 F.3d at 243 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that federal 
courts are not meant to serve as large criminal courts). 
 249 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (explaining that Congress could 
not regulate gender-motivated, violent crimes because such crimes have historically fallen under the 
jurisdiction of the states); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (worrying that if the 
Court upheld the federal statute criminalizing the possession of firearms in schools, then it would 
necessarily grant Congress the ability to regulate any type of crime). The Court in 1995 in United 
States v. Lopez concluded its opinion by stating that there must be a difference between “national” and 
“local” activities. 514 U.S. at 567–68. 
 250 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1964) (finding that Congress could regu-
late racial discrimination in restaurants under the Commerce Clause because racial discrimination in 
restaurants across the country affected interstate commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127–
29 (1942) (describing how Congress could regulate activities that appear entirely local when those 
activities, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate commerce). 
 251 See United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1214 (5th Cir. 1997) (expressing the concern 
that requiring a showing of a substantial effect on interstate commerce in each Hobbs Act case would 
be “call[ing] into question” the Supreme Court’s 1964 ruling in Katzenbach v. McClung, which used 
the aggregation principle to uphold the Civil Rights Act of 1964); see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (disallowing discrimination in restaurants, motels, and other businesses on the 
basis of race). 
 252 See United States v. Diaz, 248 F.3d 1065, 1084–85 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that, although 
robberies of businesses generally satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element, robberies of individuals 
do so in only certain circumstances); United States v. Wang, 222 F.3d 234, 239–40 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that, due to the lesser burden for the government to prove robberies of businesses under 
the Hobbs Act, the “overwhelming majority” of Hobbs Act cases will involve robberies of business-
es). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in 2001 in United States v. Diaz explained the 
certain instances in which robberies of individuals satisfy the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. 248 
F.3d at 1084–85. 
 253 See McLetchie, supra note 207, at 228 (explaining that courts sometimes favor categorical 
rules because they provide clear guidance). 
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courts need to decide only whether the defendant used the internet rather than 
applying a case-by-case inquiry.254 This makes rulings more predictable, dis-
couraging litigation on the issue.255 Moreover, the functional method will re-
sult in more appeals, because parties will hope that an appeals court will reach 
a different conclusion in applying the case-by-case analysis.256 Nonetheless, 
even though the categorical rules are more efficient, courts should adopt the 
functional method because it leads to just outcomes by discouraging prosecu-
tors from forum shopping in pursuit of harsher sentences and allowing defend-
ants the opportunity to show why internet use should not trigger the Hobbs Act 
in their particular cases.257 With the United States already facing the issue of 
mass incarceration, the deterrence of forum shopping for longer penal sentenc-
es trumps the efficiency value of a categorical rule.258 
The most notable drawback of the categorical rules is that they offer Con-
gress the ability to federalize most crimes.259 Due to the internet’s overwhelm-
ing prominence in today’s world, Congress could federalize countless crimes 
by simply enacting criminal statutes with a commerce element identical to that 
of the Hobbs Act.260 The internet would thereby offer Congress unbridled 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See id. (stating that judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys could all benefit from bright-
line rules that are “easy to follow”). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s 2017 opinion in 
United States v. Person demonstrated how easily a categorical rule could be applied to internet use 
when it ruled on the issue in three sentences. See 714 F. App’x 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
the defendant’s use of Craigslist to conduct a robbery satisfied the Hobbs Act’s commerce element 
because he utilized the internet). 
 255 See Gray, supra note 184, at 710 (arguing that providing a clear rule on an issue creates “pre-
dictability” as to how the law will be applied, which is beneficial for everyone involved). Although 
previous scholarship examined the benefits of a clear rule in the context of a child pornography stat-
ute, these same principles can apply to the categorical rules discussed in this Note. Id. 
 256 See McLetchie, supra note 207, at 228 (explaining that categorical rules “reduce the number 
of appeals”). 
 257 See United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 526–27 (5th Cir. 1997) (DeMoss, J., dissenting in 
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heightened sentences); see also Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 14, at 668 (examining how the 
federalization of crimes traditionally handled by the states can undercut state laws on sentencing). 
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power to expand federal criminal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.261 
Such a result directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Lopez 
and Morrison that Congress cannot regulate all crimes through the Commerce 
Clause.262 Ultimately, a categorical approach would functionally eliminate the 
state and federal distinction in robbery prosecutions, and would significantly 
expand the caseload of the federal courts.263 
CONCLUSION 
Although federal courts interpret the Hobbs Act’s commerce element 
broadly, it is currently unclear when internet use establishes jurisdiction under 
the Hobbs Act. With the internet’s dominant role in modern society, the deci-
sion on this issue could result in the federalizing of countless robberies, partic-
ularly robberies of individuals. This topic is notable because robberies charged 
at the federal level under the Hobbs Act rather than in state court can carry sig-
nificantly greater prison sentences. Courts, therefore, should adopt a functional 
test, wherein they conduct a case-by-case inquiry to determine whether internet 
use in a particular robbery satisfies the Hobbs Act’s commerce element. The 
Commerce Clause and the Hobbs Act case law support a functional test, and 
such a test promotes the preservation of state power and the traditional role of 
the federal courts. 
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